linux-kernel - Re: [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v5 00/11] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)

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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2008120643370.10591@namei.org>
Date:   Wed, 12 Aug 2020 07:03:12 +1000 (AEST)
From:   James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:     Chuck Lever <chucklever@...il.com>
cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
        Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>,
        snitzer@...hat.com, dm-devel@...hat.com,
        tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com, agk@...hat.com,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, nramas@...ux.microsoft.com,
        serge@...lyn.com, pasha.tatashin@...een.com,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, linux-block@...r.kernel.org,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>, mdsakib@...rosoft.com,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, eparis@...hat.com,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-audit@...hat.com,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        jaskarankhurana@...ux.microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v5 00/11] Integrity Policy Enforcement
 LSM (IPE)

On Sat, 8 Aug 2020, Chuck Lever wrote:

> My interest is in code integrity enforcement for executables stored
> in NFS files.
> 
> My struggle with IPE is that due to its dependence on dm-verity, it
> does not seem to able to protect content that is stored separately
> from its execution environment and accessed via a file access
> protocol (FUSE, SMB, NFS, etc).

It's not dependent on DM-Verity, that's just one possible integrity 
verification mechanism, and one of two supported in this initial 
version. The other is 'boot_verified' for a verified or otherwise trusted 
rootfs. Future versions will support FS-Verity, at least.

IPE was designed to be extensible in this way, with a strong separation of 
mechanism and policy.

Whatever is implemented for NFS should be able to plug in to IPE pretty 
easily.


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>