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Message-ID: <20200812014324.rtvlhvopifgkw4mi@yavin.dot.cyphar.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2020 11:43:24 +1000
From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
To: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@...omium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Mattias Nissler <mnissler@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Benjamin Gordon <bmgordon@...gle.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@...gle.com>,
Jesse Barnes <jsbarnes@...gle.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Micah Morton <mortonm@...gle.com>,
Raul Rangel <rrangel@...gle.com>,
Ross Zwisler <zwisler@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7] Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.
On 2020-08-11, Ross Zwisler <zwisler@...omium.org> wrote:
> From: Mattias Nissler <mnissler@...omium.org>
>
> For mounts that have the new "nosymfollow" option, don't follow symlinks
> when resolving paths. The new option is similar in spirit to the
> existing "nodev", "noexec", and "nosuid" options, as well as to the
> LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS resolve flag in the openat2(2) syscall. Various BSD
> variants have been supporting the "nosymfollow" mount option for a long
> time with equivalent implementations.
>
> Note that symlinks may still be created on file systems mounted with
> the "nosymfollow" option present. readlink() remains functional, so
> user space code that is aware of symlinks can still choose to follow
> them explicitly.
>
> Setting the "nosymfollow" mount option helps prevent privileged
> writers from modifying files unintentionally in case there is an
> unexpected link along the accessed path. The "nosymfollow" option is
> thus useful as a defensive measure for systems that need to deal with
> untrusted file systems in privileged contexts.
>
> More information on the history and motivation for this patch can be
> found here:
>
> https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/hardening-against-malicious-stateful-data#TOC-Restricting-symlink-traversal
Looks good. Did you plan to add an in-tree test for this (you could
shove it in tools/testing/selftests/mount)?
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mattias Nissler <mnissler@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@...gle.com>
> ---
> Changes since v6 [1]:
> * Rebased onto v5.8.
> * Another round of testing including readlink(1), readlink(2),
> realpath(1), realpath(3), statfs(2) and mount(2) to make sure
> everything still works.
>
> After this lands I will upstream changes to util-linux[2] and man-pages
> [3].
>
> [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/3/4/770
> [2]: https://github.com/rzwisler/util-linux/commit/7f8771acd85edb70d97921c026c55e1e724d4e15
> [3]: https://github.com/rzwisler/man-pages/commit/b8fe8079f64b5068940c0144586e580399a71668
> ---
> fs/namei.c | 3 ++-
> fs/namespace.c | 2 ++
> fs/proc_namespace.c | 1 +
> fs/statfs.c | 2 ++
> include/linux/mount.h | 3 ++-
> include/linux/statfs.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 1 +
> 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 72d4219c93acb..ed68478fb1fb6 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -1626,7 +1626,8 @@ static const char *pick_link(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link,
> return ERR_PTR(error);
> }
>
> - if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS))
> + if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS) ||
> + unlikely(nd->path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSYMFOLLOW))
> return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
>
> if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)) {
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 4a0f600a33285..1cbbf5a9b954f 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -3167,6 +3167,8 @@ long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
> mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_RELATIME | MNT_NOATIME);
> if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
> mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
> + if (flags & MS_NOSYMFOLLOW)
> + mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSYMFOLLOW;
>
> /* The default atime for remount is preservation */
> if ((flags & MS_REMOUNT) &&
> diff --git a/fs/proc_namespace.c b/fs/proc_namespace.c
> index 3059a9394c2d6..e59d4bb3a89e4 100644
> --- a/fs/proc_namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/proc_namespace.c
> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static void show_mnt_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct vfsmount *mnt)
> { MNT_NOATIME, ",noatime" },
> { MNT_NODIRATIME, ",nodiratime" },
> { MNT_RELATIME, ",relatime" },
> + { MNT_NOSYMFOLLOW, ",nosymfollow" },
> { 0, NULL }
> };
> const struct proc_fs_opts *fs_infop;
> diff --git a/fs/statfs.c b/fs/statfs.c
> index 2616424012ea7..59f33752c1311 100644
> --- a/fs/statfs.c
> +++ b/fs/statfs.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ static int flags_by_mnt(int mnt_flags)
> flags |= ST_NODIRATIME;
> if (mnt_flags & MNT_RELATIME)
> flags |= ST_RELATIME;
> + if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOSYMFOLLOW)
> + flags |= ST_NOSYMFOLLOW;
> return flags;
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
> index de657bd211fa6..aaf343b38671c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mount.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mount.h
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct fs_context;
> #define MNT_NODIRATIME 0x10
> #define MNT_RELATIME 0x20
> #define MNT_READONLY 0x40 /* does the user want this to be r/o? */
> +#define MNT_NOSYMFOLLOW 0x80
>
> #define MNT_SHRINKABLE 0x100
> #define MNT_WRITE_HOLD 0x200
> @@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ struct fs_context;
> #define MNT_SHARED_MASK (MNT_UNBINDABLE)
> #define MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK (MNT_NOSUID | MNT_NODEV | MNT_NOEXEC \
> | MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME \
> - | MNT_READONLY)
> + | MNT_READONLY | MNT_NOSYMFOLLOW)
> #define MNT_ATIME_MASK (MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME )
>
> #define MNT_INTERNAL_FLAGS (MNT_SHARED | MNT_WRITE_HOLD | MNT_INTERNAL | \
> diff --git a/include/linux/statfs.h b/include/linux/statfs.h
> index 9bc69edb8f188..fac4356ea1bfc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/statfs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/statfs.h
> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct kstatfs {
> #define ST_NOATIME 0x0400 /* do not update access times */
> #define ST_NODIRATIME 0x0800 /* do not update directory access times */
> #define ST_RELATIME 0x1000 /* update atime relative to mtime/ctime */
> +#define ST_NOSYMFOLLOW 0x2000 /* do not follow symlinks */
>
> struct dentry;
> extern int vfs_get_fsid(struct dentry *dentry, __kernel_fsid_t *fsid);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
> index 96a0240f23fed..dd8306ea336c1 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #define MS_REMOUNT 32 /* Alter flags of a mounted FS */
> #define MS_MANDLOCK 64 /* Allow mandatory locks on an FS */
> #define MS_DIRSYNC 128 /* Directory modifications are synchronous */
> +#define MS_NOSYMFOLLOW 256 /* Do not follow symlinks */
> #define MS_NOATIME 1024 /* Do not update access times. */
> #define MS_NODIRATIME 2048 /* Do not update directory access times */
> #define MS_BIND 4096
> --
> 2.28.0.236.gb10cc79966-goog
>
--
Aleksa Sarai
Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
<https://www.cyphar.com/>
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