linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] mm: extend memfd with ability to create "secret" memory areas

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Message-ID: <6e020a65-b516-9407-228f-2a3a32947ab9@intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 14 Aug 2020 11:09:46 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] mm: extend memfd with ability to create "secret"
 memory areas

On 8/14/20 10:46 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I'm a little unconvinced about the security benefits.  As far as I
> know, UC memory will not end up in cache by any means (unless
> aliased), but it's going to be tough to do much with UC data with
> anything resembling reasonable performance without derived values
> getting cached.

I think this is much more in the category of raising the bar than
providing any absolute security guarantees.

Let's say you have a secret and you read it into some registers and then
spill them on the stack.  You've got two cached copies, one for the
primary data and another for the stack copy.  Secret areas don't get rid
of the stack copy, but they do get rid of the other one.  One cache copy
is better than two.  Bar raised. :)

There are also some stronger protections, less in the bar-raising
category.  On x86 at least, uncached accesses also crush speculation.
You can't, for instance, speculatively get wrong values if you're not
speculating in the first place.  I was thinking of things like Load
Value Injection[1].

I _believe_ there are also things like AES-NI that can get strong
protection from stuff like this.  They load encryption keys into (AVX)
registers and then can do encrypt/decrypt operations without the keys
leaving the registers.  If the key was loaded from a secret memory area
right into the registers, I think the protection from cache attacks
would be pretty strong.

1.
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-load-value-injection