lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Sat, 15 Aug 2020 09:39:02 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
Cc:     Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@...nel.org>,
        Patrick Bellasi <patrick.bellasi@....com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        notify@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/2] Break heap spraying needed for exploiting
 use-after-free

On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 06:19:20PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
> I've found an easy way to break heap spraying for use-after-free
> exploitation. I simply extracted slab freelist quarantine from KASAN
> functionality and called it CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE. Please see patch 1.

Ah yeah, good idea. :)

> [...]
> I did a brief performance evaluation of this feature.
> 
> 1. Memory consumption. KASAN quarantine uses 1/32 of the memory.
> CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE disabled:
>   # free -m
>                 total        used        free      shared  buff/cache   available
>   Mem:           1987          39        1862          10          86        1907
>   Swap:             0           0           0
> CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE enabled:
>   # free -m
>                 total        used        free      shared  buff/cache   available
>   Mem:           1987         140        1760          10          87        1805
>   Swap:             0           0           0

1/32 of memory doesn't seem too bad for someone interested in this defense.

> 2. Performance penalty. I used `hackbench -s 256 -l 200 -g 15 -f 25 -P`.
> CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE disabled (x86_64, CONFIG_SLUB):
>   Times: 3.088, 3.103, 3.068, 3.103, 3.107
>   Mean: 3.0938
>   Standard deviation: 0.0144
> CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE enabled (x86_64, CONFIG_SLUB):
>   Times: 3.303, 3.329, 3.356, 3.314, 3.292
>   Mean: 3.3188 (+7.3%)
>   Standard deviation: 0.0223

That's rather painful, but hackbench can produce some big deltas given
it can be an unrealistic workload for most systems. I'd be curious to
see the "building a kernel" timings, which tends to be much more
realistic for "busy system" without hammering one particular subsystem
(though it's a bit VFS heavy, obviously).

More notes in the patches...

-- 
Kees Cook

Powered by blists - more mailing lists