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Message-Id: <20200817143852.460572048@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 17:15:43 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jason Baron <jbaron@...mai.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.8 390/464] tcp: correct read of TFO keys on big endian systems
From: Jason Baron <jbaron@...mai.com>
[ Upstream commit f19008e676366c44e9241af57f331b6c6edf9552 ]
When TFO keys are read back on big endian systems either via the global
sysctl interface or via getsockopt() using TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY, the values
don't match what was written.
For example, on s390x:
# echo "1-2-3-4" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key
# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key
02000000-01000000-04000000-03000000
Instead of:
# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key
00000001-00000002-00000003-00000004
Fix this by converting to the correct endianness on read. This was
reported by Colin Ian King when running the 'tcp_fastopen_backup_key' net
selftest on s390x, which depends on the read value matching what was
written. I've confirmed that the test now passes on big and little endian
systems.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@...mai.com>
Fixes: 438ac88009bc ("net: fastopen: robustness and endianness fixes for SipHash")
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
include/net/tcp.h | 2 ++
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 16 ++++------------
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 16 ++++------------
net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -1664,6 +1664,8 @@ void tcp_fastopen_destroy_cipher(struct
void tcp_fastopen_ctx_destroy(struct net *net);
int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
void *primary_key, void *backup_key);
+int tcp_fastopen_get_cipher(struct net *net, struct inet_connection_sock *icsk,
+ u64 *key);
void tcp_fastopen_add_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
struct sock *tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -301,24 +301,16 @@ static int proc_tcp_fastopen_key(struct
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = ((TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH *
2 * TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX) +
(TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX * 5)) };
- struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
- u32 user_key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX * 4];
- __le32 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX * 4];
+ u32 user_key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH / sizeof(u32)];
+ __le32 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH / sizeof(__le32)];
char *backup_data;
- int ret, i = 0, off = 0, n_keys = 0;
+ int ret, i = 0, off = 0, n_keys;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
- rcu_read_lock();
- ctx = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx);
- if (ctx) {
- n_keys = tcp_fastopen_context_len(ctx);
- memcpy(&key[0], &ctx->key[0], TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH * n_keys);
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
+ n_keys = tcp_fastopen_get_cipher(net, NULL, (u64 *)key);
if (!n_keys) {
memset(&key[0], 0, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
n_keys = 1;
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -3694,22 +3694,14 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock
return 0;
case TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY: {
- __u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH];
- struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
- unsigned int key_len = 0;
+ u64 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH / sizeof(u64)];
+ unsigned int key_len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
- rcu_read_lock();
- ctx = rcu_dereference(icsk->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq.ctx);
- if (ctx) {
- key_len = tcp_fastopen_context_len(ctx) *
- TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH;
- memcpy(&key[0], &ctx->key[0], key_len);
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
+ key_len = tcp_fastopen_get_cipher(net, icsk, key) *
+ TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, key_len);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -108,6 +108,29 @@ out:
return err;
}
+int tcp_fastopen_get_cipher(struct net *net, struct inet_connection_sock *icsk,
+ u64 *key)
+{
+ struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
+ int n_keys = 0, i;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (icsk)
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(icsk->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq.ctx);
+ else
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx);
+ if (ctx) {
+ n_keys = tcp_fastopen_context_len(ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) {
+ put_unaligned_le64(ctx->key[i].key[0], key + (i * 2));
+ put_unaligned_le64(ctx->key[i].key[1], key + (i * 2) + 1);
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return n_keys;
+}
+
static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_cipher(struct request_sock *req,
struct sk_buff *syn,
const siphash_key_t *key,
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