linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.8 243/464] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Mon, 17 Aug 2020 17:13:16 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.8 243/464] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond

From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit db2045f5892a9db7354442bf77f9b03b50ff9ee1 ]

The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.

Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.

An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:

 dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t

An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.

Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a3d72342408ad..a77e0b34e72f7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
  * to the old, stale LSM policy.  Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -998,6 +1009,16 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		/* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */
 		break;
 	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
 	case KEY_CHECK:
 		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
 			return false;
-- 
2.25.1