[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <a5b9e465-bcb5-e56a-513b-6c9094b8fa81@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 16:20:24 -0700
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>,
tusharsu@...ux.microsoft.com, sashal@...nel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
SElinux list <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] SELinux: Measure state and hash of policy using IMA
On 8/17/20 4:11 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-08-17 at 15:33 -0700, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
>> On 8/17/20 3:00 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 8/17/2020 2:31 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 2020-08-13 at 14:13 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 2:03 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
>>>>> <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
>>>>>>> <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c
>>>>>>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>>>>>>> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae
>>>>>>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>>>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c
>>>>>>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
>>>>>>>>>> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len,
>>>>>>>>>> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len)
>>>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>>>> + struct crypto_shash *tfm;
>>>>>>>>>> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
>>>>>>>>>> + void *digest = NULL;
>>>>>>>>>> + int desc_size;
>>>>>>>>>> + int digest_size;
>>>>>>>>>> + int ret = 0;
>>>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>>> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
>>>>>>>>>> + if (IS_ERR(tfm))
>>>>>>>>>> + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
>>>>>>>>> Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing
>>>>>>>>> to a new selinuxfs node?
>>>>>>>> I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm.
>>>>>>> Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current
>>>>>> hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash
>>>>>> algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better?
>>>>> This is why I preferred just passing the serialized policy buffer to
>>>>> IMA and letting it handle the hashing. But apparently that approach
>>>>> wouldn't fly. IMA appears to support both a Kconfig option for
>>>>> selecting a default algorithm and a kernel parameter for overriding
>>>>> it. I assume the idea is that the distros can pick a reasonable
>>>>> default and then the end users can override that if they have specific
>>>>> requirements. I'd want the same for SELinux. If IMA is willing to
>>>>> export its hash algorithm to external components, then I'm willing to
>>>>> reuse that but not sure if that's a layering violation.
>>>> With the new ima_measure_critical_data() hook, I agree with you and
>>>> Casey it doesn't make sense for each caller to have to write their own
>>>> function. Casey suggested exporting IMA's hash function or defining a
>>>> new common hash function. There's nothing specific to IMA.
>>>
>>> Except that no one is going to use the function unless they're
>>> doing an IMA operation.
>>
>> Can we do the following instead:
>>
>> In ima_measure_critical_data() IMA hook, we can add another param for
>> the caller to indicate whether
>>
>> => The contents of "buf" needs to be measured
>> OR
>> => Hash of the contents of "buf" needs to be measured.
>>
>> This way IMA doesn't need to export any new function to meet the hashing
>> requirement.
>
> I'm not sure overloading the parameters is a good idea, but extending
> ima_measure_critical_data() to calculate a simple buffer hash should be
> fine.
>
Sorry I wasn't clear - I didn't mean to say overload existing
parameters, but extending the IMA hook to calculate the hash of the
buffer - like the following:
int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
const char *event_data_source,
const void *buf, int buf_len,
bool measure_buf_hash);
If measure_buf_hash is true, IMA will calculate the hash of contents of
"buf" and measure the hash.
Else, IMA will measure the contents of "buf".
-lakshmi
Powered by blists - more mailing lists