| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20200818154230.14016-11-krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 17:42:20 +0200
From: <krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com>
To: <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
<sunyuqiong1988@...il.com>, <mkayaalp@...binghamton.edu>,
<dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>, <serge@...lyn.com>,
<jmorris@...ei.org>, <christian@...uner.io>,
<silviu.vlasceanu@...wei.com>, <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 20/30] ima: Parse per ima namespace policy file
From: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com>
Parse per ima namespace policy file if the file path is set.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 7 ++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 17 +++++++++++------
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 25 +++++++++++--------------
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 48d09efaffbe..b55d25c2bf63 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -309,10 +309,10 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_init_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns,
const struct ima_policy_setup_data *policy_setup_data);
-void ima_update_policy(void);
+void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
void ima_update_policy_flag(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
-ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
-void ima_delete_rules(void);
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
+void ima_delete_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
void ima_delete_ns_rules(struct ima_policy_data *policy_data,
bool is_root_ns);
+ssize_t ima_read_ns_policy(char *path, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
ssize_t ima_ns_write_policy_for_children(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns,
char *policy_path);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 6c033857f521..7b93c338a478 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
.release = seq_release,
};
-static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
+static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
void *data;
char *datap;
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = data;
while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
- rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
+ rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p, ima_ns);
if (rc < 0)
break;
size -= rc;
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out_free;
if (data[0] == '/') {
- result = ima_read_policy(data);
+ result = ima_read_policy(data, ima_ns);
} else if (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
1, 0);
result = -EACCES;
} else {
- result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+ result = ima_parse_add_rule(data, ima_ns);
}
mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
out_free:
@@ -502,13 +502,13 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
"policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
if (!valid_policy) {
- ima_delete_rules();
+ ima_delete_rules(ima_ns);
valid_policy = 1;
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
return 0;
}
- ima_update_policy();
+ ima_update_policy(ima_ns);
#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
ima_policy = NULL;
@@ -629,6 +629,11 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_kcmd_for_children_ops = {
.open = ima_open_for_children,
.write = ima_write_kcmd_for_children,
};
+
+ssize_t ima_read_ns_policy(char *path, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
+{
+ return ima_read_policy(path, ima_ns);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
int __init ima_fs_init(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index dd0328ee715f..ec3abc803c82 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -91,10 +91,24 @@ static int ima_set_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
setup_data.ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
#endif
ima_init_ns_policy(ima_ns, &setup_data);
- return result;
+ } else {
+ ima_init_ns_policy(ima_ns, ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children);
}
- ima_init_ns_policy(ima_ns, ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children);
+ if (ima_ns->policy_path_for_children) {
+ result = ima_read_ns_policy(ima_ns->policy_path_for_children,
+ ima_ns);
+ if ((result >= 0) && !ima_check_policy(ima_ns)) {
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+ "policy_update", "completed", 0, 0);
+ ima_update_policy(ima_ns);
+ } else {
+ ima_delete_rules(ima_ns);
+ ima_delete_ns_rules(ima_ns->policy_data, false);
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+ "policy_update", "failed", 1, 0);
+ }
+ }
return result;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3d712c062ed0..d4774eab6a98 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -735,7 +735,8 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns,
}
}
-static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry);
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns);
static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
{
@@ -765,7 +766,8 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
result = strlcpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry[i].list);
- result = ima_parse_rule(rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]);
+ result = ima_parse_rule(rule, &arch_policy_entry[i],
+ &init_ima_ns);
if (result) {
pr_warn("Skipping unknown architecture policy rule: %s\n",
rule);
@@ -895,10 +897,8 @@ int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
* Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
* we switch from the default policy to user defined.
*/
-void ima_update_policy(void)
+void ima_update_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
- /* Update only the current ima namespace */
- struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();
struct list_head *policy = &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_rules;
list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_ns->policy_data->ima_temp_rules,
@@ -1151,7 +1151,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
return true;
}
-static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+ struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *from;
@@ -1160,7 +1161,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
int result = 0;
size_t keyrings_len;
- struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();
ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
@@ -1547,19 +1547,18 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
/**
* ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
* @rule - ima measurement policy rule
+ * @ima_ns - pointer to the ima namespace the rule will be added to
*
* Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
* Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
*/
-ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
static const char op[] = "update_policy";
char *p;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
- /* Add rules only to the current ima namespace */
- struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1577,7 +1576,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
- result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
+ result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry, ima_ns);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
@@ -1597,10 +1596,8 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
* different from the active one. There is also only one user of
* ima_delete_rules() at a time.
*/
-void ima_delete_rules(void)
+void ima_delete_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)
{
- /* Delete rules only from the current ima namespace */
- struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
ima_ns->policy_data->temp_ima_appraise = 0;
--
2.20.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists