linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RESEND] docs: update trusted-encrypted.rst

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Date:   Thu, 20 Aug 2020 00:01:33 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Coly Li <colyli@...e.de>, Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] docs: update trusted-encrypted.rst

On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 09:19:18AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2020-08-18 at 18:44 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Sun, Aug 16, 2020 at 10:12:13AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2020-08-17 at 00:57 +0800, Coly Li wrote:
> > > > On 2020/8/17 00:36, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > > > On Sun, 2020-08-16 at 12:06 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > > A note in this file states this:
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle
> > > > > > 0x81000001, append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements
> > > > > > between quotes, such as "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001".
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Now if someone was (still) interested in TPM 1.2 
> > > > > > adapt the  note to state that these keyhandle=... should be
> > > > > > removed for the TPM 1.2 case.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Actually, I also have a plan to match what userspace does and
> > > > > simply assume a keyhandle of 40000001 (generate an EC Storage
> > > > > Primary Key on the fly) if it's not specified, which will make
> > > > > the TPM1.2 and 2.0 versions of this the same.  Unfortunately
> > > > > the necessary precursor patches are taking an age to get
> > > > > upstream.
> > > > 
> > > > Hi James,
> > > > 
> > > > Do you have a plan to push such patches into upstream soon? If
> > > > yes than I may wait for your patch and withdraw this one.
> > > 
> > > Well, as I said above it depends on not yet upstream precursor
> > > patches.  They have been pending for about a year, so I've no real
> > > idea of the timeline.
> > > 
> > > James
> > 
> > As far as I remember there was not much left in the previous version
> > to do. Some time has passed when it was discussed but I recall it was
> > mainly about documenting the key format.
> 
> Actually, no, unfortunately it's not in that update.  Generating an on-
> the-fly primary would involve the cryptographic security patch (same
> mechanism as used to generate the null primary).  I was thinking I'd
> extract just that piece and use it in a follow on.  So both the rework
> of the key format and this extra patch that's not yet even broken out
> of the TPM security series are required precursors.
> 
> James

OK, sorry I mixed up thinks. Thanks.

/Jarkko