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Message-Id: <20200820091613.493972556@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 11:21:33 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 118/228] Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
[ Upstream commit 42a2df3e829f3c5562090391b33714b2e2e5ad4a ]
We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.
Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
security/smack/smackfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 981f582539acf..accd3846f1e3e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
}
ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
- if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
+ if (ret != 1 || maplevel < 0 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
goto out;
rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
--
2.25.1
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