[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <caedd49bc2080a2fb8b16b9ecacab67d11e68fd7.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 16:14:36 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, mjg59@...gle.com
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if the
HMAC key is loaded
Hi Roberto,
On Thu, 2020-06-18 at 18:01 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Granting metadata write is safe if the HMAC key is not loaded, as it won't
> let an attacker obtain a valid HMAC from corrupted xattrs. evm_write_key()
> however does not allow it if any key is loaded, including a public key,
> which should not be a problem.
>
Why is the existing hebavior a problem? What is the problem being
solved?
> This patch allows setting EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES if the EVM_INIT_HMAC
> flag is not set.
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 4.16.x
> Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> index cfc3075769bb..92fe26ace797 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> * keys are loaded.
> */
> if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
> - ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) &&
> + ((evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) &&
> !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES))
> return -EPERM;
>
Documentation/ABI/testing/evm needs to be updated as well.
thanks,
Mimi
Powered by blists - more mailing lists