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Message-ID: <CA+EESO5u89hEqgmBZMKq9njHvAKyWJJusVtkSLFHoQpv8rBzMg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 20:48:52 -0700
From: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD
On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 11:36 AM James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 7 Aug 2020, Lokesh Gidra wrote:
>
> > Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very
> > useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use
> > less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd
> > file descriptors and in the future, other kinds of
> > anonymous-inode-based file descriptor. SELinux policy authors can
> > apply policy types to anonymous inodes by providing name-based
> > transition rules keyed off the anonymous inode internal name (
> > "[userfaultfd]" in the case of userfaultfd(2) file descriptors) and
> > applying policy to the new SIDs thus produced.
>
> Can you expand more on why this would be useful, e.g. use-cases?
>
With SELinux managed userfaultfd file descriptors, an administrator
can control creation and movement of them. In particular, handling of
a userfaultfd descriptor by a different process is essentially a
ptrace access into the process, without any of the
corresponding security_ptrace_access_check() checks. For privacy, the
admin may want to deny such accesses,
which is possible with SELinux support.
I'll add this use case in the cover letter too in the next version.
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