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Message-ID: <d4c9d5333256b17acdbe41729dd680f534266130.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 13:45:00 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, mjg59@...gle.com
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when
the HMAC key is loaded
Hi Roberto,
On Fri, 2020-08-21 at 14:30 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Sorry for the delay in reviewing these patches. Missing from this
> patch set is a cover letter with an explanation for grouping these
> patches into a patch set, other than for convenience. In this case, it
> would be along the lines that the original use case for EVM portable
> and immutable keys support was for a few critical files, not combined
> with an EVM encrypted key type. This patch set more fully integrates
> the initial EVM portable and immutable signature support.
Thank you for more fully integrating the EVM portable signatures into
IMA.
" [PATCH 08/11] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM
portable signatures" equates an IMA signature to having a portable and
immutable EVM signature. That is true in terms of signature
verification, but from an attestation perspective the "ima-sig"
template will not contain a signature. If not the EVM signature, then
at least some other indication should be included in the measurement
list.
Are you planning on posting the associated IMA/EVM regression tests?
Mimi
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