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Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 17:26:36 -0700 From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> Subject: [PATCH v11 1/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER. Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP- oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it. When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without IBT protection. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> --- v10: - Change build-time CET check to config depends on. arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 6b6dad011763..b047e0a8d1c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1963,6 +1963,22 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER If unsure, say y. +config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER + prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode" + def_bool n + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 + depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection) + select X86_INTEL_CET + help + Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against + CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks. It is active when + the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and + the application support it. When this feature is enabled, + legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without + IBT protection. + + If unsure, say y + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI -- 2.21.0
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