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Message-ID: <87y2m1qlj6.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 21:01:17 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Reshetova\, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] mm: extend memfd with ability to create "secret" memory areas
* Andy Lutomirski:
>> I _believe_ there are also things like AES-NI that can get strong
>> protection from stuff like this. They load encryption keys into (AVX)
>> registers and then can do encrypt/decrypt operations without the keys
>> leaving the registers. If the key was loaded from a secret memory area
>> right into the registers, I think the protection from cache attacks
>> would be pretty strong.
>
> Except for context switches :)
An rseq sequence could request that the AVX registers should be
cleared on context switch. (I'm mostly kidding.)
I think the main issue is that we do not have a good established
programming model to actually use such features and completely avoid
making copies of secret data.
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