linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests

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Message-ID: <202008261237.904C1E6@keescook>
Date:   Wed, 26 Aug 2020 12:40:24 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Cc:     Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>,
        Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@...hat.com>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>,
        io-uring <io-uring@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted
 applications and guests

On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 10:47:36AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 8/25/20 9:20 AM, Stefano Garzarella wrote:
> > Hi Jens,
> > this is a gentle ping.
> > 
> > I'll respin, using memdup_user() for restriction registration.
> > I'd like to get some feedback to see if I should change anything else.
> > 
> > Do you think it's in good shape?
> 
> As far as I'm concerned, this is fine. But I want to make sure that Kees
> is happy with it, as he's the one that's been making noise on this front.

Oop! Sorry, I didn't realize this was blocked on me. Once I saw how
orthogonal io_uring was to "regular" process trees, I figured this
series didn't need seccomp input. (I mean, I am still concerned about
attack surface reduction, but that seems like a hard problem given
io_uring's design -- it is, however, totally covered by the LSMs, so I'm
satisfied from that perspective.)

I'll go review... thanks for the poke. :)

-- 
Kees Cook