linux-kernel - [PATCH 3/3] KVM: nSVM: more strict SMM checks when returning to nested guest

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Date:   Thu, 27 Aug 2020 19:27:20 +0300
From:   Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] KVM: nSVM: more strict SMM checks when returning to nested guest

* check that guest is 64 bit guest, otherwise the SVM related fields
  in the smm state area are not defined

* If the SMM area indicates that SMM interrupted a running guest,
  check that EFER.SVME which is also saved in this area is set, otherwise
  the guest might have tampered with SMM save area, and so indicate
  emulation failure which should triple fault the guest.

* Check that that guest CPUID supports SVM (due to the same issue as above)

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 03dd7bac80348..0cfb8c08e744e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3900,21 +3900,28 @@ static int svm_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
 static int svm_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
-	struct vmcb *nested_vmcb;
 	struct kvm_host_map map;
-	u64 guest;
-	u64 vmcb;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	guest = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8);
-	vmcb = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0);
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
+		u64 saved_efer = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed0);
+		u64 guest = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ed8);
+		u64 vmcb = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ee0);
 
-	if (guest) {
-		if (kvm_vcpu_map(&svm->vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcb), &map) == -EINVAL)
-			return 1;
-		nested_vmcb = map.hva;
-		ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(svm, vmcb, nested_vmcb);
-		kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &map, true);
+		if (guest) {
+			if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM))
+				return 1;
+
+			if (!(saved_efer && EFER_SVME))
+				return 1;
+
+			if (kvm_vcpu_map(&svm->vcpu,
+					 gpa_to_gfn(vmcb), &map) == -EINVAL)
+				return 1;
+
+			ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(svm, vmcb, map.hva);
+			kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &map, true);
+		}
 	}
 
 	return ret;
-- 
2.26.2