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Message-ID: <20200827072401.6o5bqg6r5iozpcgc@steredhat.lan>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 09:24:01 +0200
From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@...hat.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>,
io-uring <io-uring@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted
applications and guests
On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 12:40:24PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 10:47:36AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> > On 8/25/20 9:20 AM, Stefano Garzarella wrote:
> > > Hi Jens,
> > > this is a gentle ping.
> > >
> > > I'll respin, using memdup_user() for restriction registration.
> > > I'd like to get some feedback to see if I should change anything else.
> > >
> > > Do you think it's in good shape?
> >
> > As far as I'm concerned, this is fine. But I want to make sure that Kees
> > is happy with it, as he's the one that's been making noise on this front.
>
> Oop! Sorry, I didn't realize this was blocked on me. Once I saw how
> orthogonal io_uring was to "regular" process trees, I figured this
> series didn't need seccomp input. (I mean, I am still concerned about
> attack surface reduction, but that seems like a hard problem given
> io_uring's design -- it is, however, totally covered by the LSMs, so I'm
> satisfied from that perspective.)
>
> I'll go review... thanks for the poke. :)
>
Jens, Kees, thanks for your feedbacks!
I'll send v5 adding the values to the enumerations.
Stefano
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