linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 08/38] media: pci: ttpci: av7110: fix possible buffer overflow caused by bad DMA value in debiirq()

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Date:   Sat, 29 Aug 2020 20:16:00 +0300
From:   Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@...asonboard.com>
To:     Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc:     Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju@...nghua.edu.cn>,
        Sean Young <sean@...s.org>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@...nel.org>,
        linux-media@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 08/38] media: pci: ttpci: av7110: fix
 possible buffer overflow caused by bad DMA value in debiirq()

On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 02:10:20PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> > The value av7110->debi_virt is stored in DMA memory, and it is assigned
> > to data, and thus data[0] can be modified at any time by malicious
> > hardware. In this case, "if (data[0] < 2)" can be passed, but then
> > data[0] can be changed into a large number, which may cause buffer
> > overflow when the code "av7110->ci_slot[data[0]]" is used.
> > 
> > To fix this possible bug, data[0] is assigned to a local variable, which
> > replaces the use of data[0].
> 
> I'm pretty sure hardware capable of manipulating memory can work
> around any such checks, but...
> 
> > +++ b/drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c
> > @@ -424,14 +424,15 @@ static void debiirq(unsigned long cookie)
> >  	case DATA_CI_GET:
> >  	{
> >  		u8 *data = av7110->debi_virt;
> > +		u8 data_0 = data[0];
> >  
> > -		if ((data[0] < 2) && data[2] == 0xff) {
> > +		if (data_0 < 2 && data[2] == 0xff) {
> >  			int flags = 0;
> >  			if (data[5] > 0)
> >  				flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_PRESENT;
> >  			if (data[5] > 5)
> >  				flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_READY;
> > -			av7110->ci_slot[data[0]].flags = flags;
> > +			av7110->ci_slot[data_0].flags = flags;
> 
> This does not even do what it says. Compiler is still free to access
> data[0] multiple times. It needs READ_ONCE() to be effective.

Yes, it seems quite dubious to me. If we *really* want to guard against
rogue hardware here, the whole DMA buffer should be copied. I don't
think it's worth it, a rogue PCI device can do much more harm.

-- 
Regards,

Laurent Pinchart