linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v6 70/76] x86/smpboot: Setup TSS for starting AP

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Date:   Mon, 31 Aug 2020 19:25:19 +0200
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, hpa@...or.com,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>,
        Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Mike Stunes <mstunes@...are.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 70/76] x86/smpboot: Setup TSS for starting AP

On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 10:55:05AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> @@ -1814,27 +1814,26 @@ static inline void ucode_cpu_init(int cpu)
>  		load_ucode_ap();
>  }
>  
> -static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss)
> +static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss,
> +				 struct cpu_entry_area *cea)
>  {
>  	/* Set up the per-CPU TSS IST stacks */
> -	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DF] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DF);
> -	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_NMI] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(NMI);
> -	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DB);
> -	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(MCE);
> +	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DF]  = CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, DF);
> +	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_NMI] = CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, NMI);
> +	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB]  = CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, DB);
> +	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE] = CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, MCE);

#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT

>  	/* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */
> -	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC);
> +	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]	= CEA_ESTACK_TOP(&cea->estacks, VC);

#endif

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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