linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch

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Date:   Tue, 1 Sep 2020 10:45:53 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc:     Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 25/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for
 shadow stack

On Tue, Sep 1, 2020 at 10:23 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On 9/1/2020 3:28 AM, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Thu, Aug 27, 2020 at 06:26:11AM -0700, H.J. Lu wrote:
> >> On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 12:57 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 8/26/20 11:49 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> >>>>> I would expect things like Go and various JITs to call it directly.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> If we wanted to be fancy and add a potentially more widely useful
> >>>>> syscall, how about:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> mmap_special(void *addr, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int type);
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Where type is something like MMAP_SPECIAL_X86_SHSTK.  Fundamentally,
> >>>>> this is really just mmap() except that we want to map something a bit
> >>>>> magical, and we don't want to require opening a device node to do it.
> >>>>
> >>>> One benefit of MMAP_SPECIAL_* is there are more free bits than MAP_*.
> >>>> Does ARM have similar needs for memory mapping, Dave?
> >>>
> >>> No idea.
> >>>
> >>> But, mmap_special() is *basically* mmap2() with extra-big flags space.
> >>> I suspect it will grow some more uses on top of shadow stacks.  It could
> >>> have, for instance, been used to allocate MPX bounds tables.
> >>
> >> There is no reason we can't use
> >>
> >> long arch_prctl (int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, ..);
> >>
> >> for ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK.   We just need to use
> >>
> >> syscall (SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_X86_CET_MMAP_SHSTK, ...);
> >
> >
> > For arm64 (and sparc etc.) we continue to use the regular mmap/mprotect
> > family of calls.  One or two additional arch-specific mmap flags are
> > sufficient for now.
> >
> > Is x86 definitely not going to fit within those calls?
>
> That can work for x86.  Andy, what if we create PROT_SHSTK, which can
> been seen only from the user.  Once in kernel, it is translated to
> VM_SHSTK.  One question for mremap/mprotect is, do we allow a normal
> data area to become shadow stack?

I'm unconvinced that we want to use a somewhat precious PROT_ or VM_
bit for this.  Using a flag bit makes sense if we expect anyone to
ever map an fd or similar as a shadow stack, but that seems a bit odd
in the first place.  To me, it seems more logical for a shadow stack
to be a special sort of mapping with a special vm_ops, not a normal
mapping with a special flag set.  Although I realize that we want
shadow stacks to work like anonymous memory with respect to fork().
Dave?

--Andy