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Message-ID: <CAMzpN2hRrx2R_wLT4imB3w9RApL1XK5SYcyXk5Cbp9fkY_s-Dg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 13:02:07 -0400
From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Jürgen Groß <jgross@...e.com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
"Robert O'Callahan" <rocallahan@...il.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/entry: Fix AC assertion
On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 12:31 PM <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 02, 2020 at 06:24:27PM +0200, Jürgen Groß wrote:
> > On 02.09.20 17:58, Brian Gerst wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 9:38 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
> > > >
> > > > The WARN added in commit 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further
> > > > improve user entry sanity checks") unconditionally triggers on my IVB
> > > > machine because it does not support SMAP.
> > > >
> > > > For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC/STAC instructions and thus if
> > > > userspace sets AC, we'll still have it set after entry.
> > > >
> > > > Fixes: 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")
> > > > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
> > > > Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> > > > ---
> > > > arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 11 +++++++++--
> > > > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
> > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
> > > > @@ -18,8 +18,16 @@ static __always_inline void arch_check_u
> > > > * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
> > > > */
> > > > unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
> > > > - WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & (X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_DF |
> > > > - X86_EFLAGS_NT));
> > > > + unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
> > > > +
> > > > + /*
> > > > + * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry.
> > > > + */
> > > > + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
> > > > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64_BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)))
> > > > + mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;
> > >
> > > Is the explicit Xen check necessary? IIRC the Xen hypervisor will
> > > filter out the SMAP bit in the cpuid pvop.
> >
> > Right, and this test will nevertheless result in setting AC in the mask.
> > IIRC this was the main objective here.
>
> Correct, this asserts that 64bit Xen-PV will never have AC set; it had
> better not have it set since it runs in ring 3.
Ok. That should be added to the comment to avoid confusion.
--
Brian Gerst
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