linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v7 17/23] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide protection of kernel-mode

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Date:   Wed, 02 Sep 2020 09:53:29 +0200
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:     Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>
Cc:     Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@...italocean.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Vineeth Pillai <viremana@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Aaron Lu <aaron.lwe@...il.com>,
        Aubrey Li <aubrey.intel@...il.com>,
        Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@...cle.com>,
        Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@...cle.com>,
        Nishanth Aravamudan <naravamudan@...italocean.com>,
        mingo@...nel.org, pjt@...gle.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, fweisbec@...il.com,
        keescook@...omium.org, kerrnel@...gle.com,
        Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>,
        Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@....com>,
        Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, vineeth@...byteword.org,
        Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
        Agata Gruza <agata.gruza@...el.com>,
        Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@...el.com>,
        graf@...zon.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com, dfaggioli@...e.com,
        rostedt@...dmis.org, derkling@...gle.com, benbjiang@...cent.com,
        Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...el.com>,
        "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 17/23] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide protection of kernel-mode

Joel,

On Tue, Sep 01 2020 at 21:29, Joel Fernandes wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 01, 2020 at 10:02:10PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> The generated code for the CONFIG_PRETENT_HT_SECURE=n case is the same
>
> When you say 'pretend', did you mean 'make' ? The point of this patch is to
> protect the kernel from the other hyperthread thus making HT secure for the
> kernel contexts and not merely pretending.

I'm paranoid and don't trust HT at all. There is too much shared state.

>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/include/linux/pretend_ht_secure.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
>> +#ifndef _LINUX_PRETEND_HT_SECURE_H
>> +#define _LINUX_PRETEND_HT_SECURE_H
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PRETEND_HT_SECURE
>> +static inline void enter_from_user_ht_sucks(void)
>> +{
>> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&pretend_ht_secure_key))
>> +		enter_from_user_pretend_ht_is_secure();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void exit_to_user_ht_sucks(void)
>> +{
>> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&pretend_ht_secure_key))
>> +		exit_to_user_pretend_ht_is_secure();
>
> We already have similar config and static keys for the core-scheduling
> feature itself. Can we just make it depend on that?

Of course. This was just for illustration. :)

> Or, are you saying users may want 'core scheduling' enabled but may want to
> leave out the kernel protection?

Core scheduling per se without all the protection muck, i.e. a relaxed
version which tries to gang schedule threads of a process on a core if
feasible has advantages to some workloads.

>> @@ -111,6 +113,12 @@ static __always_inline void exit_to_user
>>  /* Workaround to allow gradual conversion of architecture code */
>>  void __weak arch_do_signal(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
>>  
>> +static inline unsigned long exit_to_user_get_work(void)
>> +{
>> +	exit_to_user_ht_sucks();
>
> Ok, one issue with your patch is it does not take care of the waiting logic.
> sched_core_unsafe_exit_wait() needs to be called *after* all of the
> exit_to_user_mode_work is processed. This is because
> sched_core_unsafe_exit_wait() also checks for any new exit-to-usermode-work
> that popped up while it is spinning and breaks out of its spin-till-safe loop
> early. This is key to solving the stop-machine issue. If the stopper needs to
> run, then the need-resched flag will be set and we break out of the spin and
> redo the whole exit_to_user_mode_loop() as it should.

And where is the problem?

syscall_entry()
  ...
    sys_foo()
      ....
      return 0;

  local_irq_disable();
  exit_to_user_mode_prepare()
    ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work()
       {
        if (ht_muck)
          syscall_exit_ht_muck() {
            ....
            while (wait) {
            	local_irq_enable();
                while (wait) cpu_relax();
                local_irq_disable();
            }
          }
        return READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
       }

    if (unlikely(ti_work & WORK))
    	ti_work = exit_loop(ti_work)

        while (ti_work & MASK) {
          local_irq_enable();
          .....
          local_irq_disable();
          ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work()
            {
              See above
            }
       }

It covers both the 'no work' and the 'do work' exit path. If that's not
sufficient, then something is fundamentally wrong with your design.

Thanks,

        tglx