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Message-ID: <20200902133200.666781610@infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2020 15:25:50 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
Robert O'Callahan <rocallahan@...il.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/13] x86/entry: Fix AC assertion
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
The WARN added in commit 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further
improve user entry sanity checks") unconditionally triggers on my IVB
machine because it does not support SMAP.
For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC/STAC instructions and thus if
userspace sets AC, we'll still have it set after entry.
Fixes: 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -18,8 +18,16 @@ static __always_inline void arch_check_u
* state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
*/
unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
- WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & (X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_DF |
- X86_EFLAGS_NT));
+ unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
+
+ /*
+ * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64_BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)))
+ mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & mask);
/* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs));
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