linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/entry: Fix AC assertion

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Message-ID: <CAMzpN2i9C5Sj-M0b9Y7VtOphDJs2Z9NPux9Dg347PSeNBaXRMQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 2 Sep 2020 11:58:09 -0400
From:   Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>,
        Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
        "Robert O'Callahan" <rocallahan@...il.com>,
        "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
        Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/entry: Fix AC assertion

On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 9:38 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
>
> From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
>
> The WARN added in commit 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further
> improve user entry sanity checks") unconditionally triggers on my IVB
> machine because it does not support SMAP.
>
> For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC/STAC instructions and thus if
> userspace sets AC, we'll still have it set after entry.
>
> Fixes: 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h |   11 +++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
> @@ -18,8 +18,16 @@ static __always_inline void arch_check_u
>                  * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
>                  */
>                 unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
> -               WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & (X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_DF |
> -                                     X86_EFLAGS_NT));
> +               unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
> +
> +               /*
> +                * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry.
> +                */
> +               if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
> +                   (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64_BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)))
> +                       mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;

Is the explicit Xen check necessary?  IIRC the Xen hypervisor will
filter out the SMAP bit in the cpuid pvop.

--
Brian Gerst