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Message-ID: <CAG48ez1V=oVczCCSuRaWX=bbN2cOi0Y9q48=e-Fuhg7mwMOi0A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 23:21:58 +0200
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, John Wood <john.wood@....com>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@...gle.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] security/fbfam: Add a Kconfig to enable the fbfam feature
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 10:21 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> From: John Wood <john.wood@....com>
>
> Add a menu entry under "Security options" to enable the "Fork brute
> force attack mitigation" feature.
[...]
> +config FBFAM
Please give this a more descriptive name than FBFAM. Some name where,
if a random kernel developer sees an "#ifdef" with that name in some
random piece of kernel code, they immediately have a rough idea for
what kind of feature this is.
Perhaps something like THROTTLE_FORK_CRASHES. Or something else that
is equally descriptive.
> + bool "Fork brute force attack mitigation"
> + default n
"default n" is superfluous and should AFAIK be omitted.
> + help
> + This is a user defense that detects any fork brute force attack
> + based on the application's crashing rate. When this measure is
> + triggered the fork system call is blocked.
This help text claims that the mitigation will block fork(), but patch
6/6 actually kills the process hierarchy.
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