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Message-ID: <CAMj1kXGVT9HK6OTvY4rVWqGahc2NJUrabVV8sg9Ww1b7BN2uOg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 15:37:54 +0300
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
brijesh.singh@....com, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Mike Stunes <mstunes@...are.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 71/72] x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 16:49, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> wrote:
>
> On 9/9/20 7:44 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> > On 09/09/20 10:27, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> (adding Laszlo and Brijesh)
> >>
> >> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 20:46, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> + Ard so that he can ack the efi bits.
> >>>
> >>> On Mon, Sep 07, 2020 at 03:16:12PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> >>>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> >>>>
> >>>> Calling down to EFI runtime services can result in the firmware
> >>>> performing VMGEXIT calls. The firmware is likely to use the GHCB of
> >>>> the OS (e.g., for setting EFI variables),
> >
> > I've had to stare at this for a while.
> >
> > Because, normally a VMGEXIT is supposed to occur like this:
> >
> > - guest does something privileged
> > - resultant non-automatic exit (NAE) injects a #VC exception
> > - exception handler figures out what that privileged thing was
> > - exception handler submits request to hypervisor via GHCB contents plus
> > VMGEXIT instruction
> >
> > Point being, the agent that "owns" the exception handler is supposed to
> > pre-allocate or otherwise provide the GHCB too, for information passing.
> >
> > So... what is the particular NAE that occurs during the execution of
> > UEFI runtime services (at OS runtime)?
> >
> > And assuming it occurs, I'm unsure if the exception handler (IDT) at
> > that point is owned (temporarily?) by the firmware.
> >
> > - If the #VC handler comes from the firmware, then I don't know why it
> > would use the OS's GHCB.
> >
> > - If the #VC handler comes from the OS, then I don't understand why the
> > commit message says "firmware performing VMGEXIT", given that in this
> > case it would be the OS's #VC handler executing VMGEXIT.
> >
> > So, I think the above commit message implies a VMGEXIT *without* a NAE /
> > #VC context. (Because, I fail to interpret the commit message in a NAE /
> > #VC context in any way; see above.)
>
> Correct.
>
> >
> > OK, so let's see where the firmware performs a VMGEXIT *outside* of an
> > exception handler, *while* at OS runtime. There seems to be one, in file
> > "OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/QemuFlashDxe.c":
>
> Again, correct. Basically this is what is invoked when setting UEFI variables.
>
> >
> >> VOID
> >> QemuFlashPtrWrite (
> >> IN volatile UINT8 *Ptr,
> >> IN UINT8 Value
> >> )
> >> {
> >> if (MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled ()) {
> >> MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER Msr;
> >> GHCB *Ghcb;
> >>
> >> Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB);
> >> Ghcb = Msr.Ghcb;
> >>
> >> //
> >> // Writing to flash is emulated by the hypervisor through the use of write
> >> // protection. This won't work for an SEV-ES guest because the write won't
> >> // be recognized as a true MMIO write, which would result in the required
> >> // #VC exception. Instead, use the the VMGEXIT MMIO write support directly
> >> // to perform the update.
> >> //
> >> VmgInit (Ghcb);
> >> Ghcb->SharedBuffer[0] = Value;
> >> Ghcb->SaveArea.SwScratch = (UINT64) (UINTN) Ghcb->SharedBuffer;
> >> VmgExit (Ghcb, SVM_EXIT_MMIO_WRITE, (UINT64) (UINTN) Ptr, 1);
> >> VmgDone (Ghcb);
> >> } else {
> >> *Ptr = Value;
> >> }
> >> }
> >
> > This function *does* run at OS runtime (as a part of non-volatile UEFI
> > variable writes).
> >
> > And note that, wherever MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB points to at the moment, is used
> > as GHCB.
> >
> > If the guest kernel allocates its own GHCB and writes the allocation
> > address to MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, then indeed the firmware will use the GHCB
> > of the OS.
> >
> > I reviewed edk2 commit 437eb3f7a8db
> > ("OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe: Bypass flash detection with
> > SEV-ES", 2020-08-17), but I admit I never thought of the guest OS
> > changing MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB. I'm sorry about that.
> >
> > As long as this driver is running before OS runtime (i.e., during the
> > DXE and BDS phases), MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB is supposed to carry the value we
> > set in "OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c":
> >
> >> STATIC
> >> VOID
> >> AmdSevEsInitialize (
> >> VOID
> >> )
> >> {
> >> VOID *GhcbBase;
> >> PHYSICAL_ADDRESS GhcbBasePa;
> >> UINTN GhcbPageCount, PageCount;
> >> RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus, DecryptStatus;
> >> IA32_DESCRIPTOR Gdtr;
> >> VOID *Gdt;
> >>
> >> if (!MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled ()) {
> >> return;
> >> }
> >>
> >> PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (PcdSevEsIsEnabled, TRUE);
> >> ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
> >>
> >> //
> >> // Allocate GHCB and per-CPU variable pages.
> >> // Since the pages must survive across the UEFI to OS transition
> >> // make them reserved.
> >> //
> >> GhcbPageCount = mMaxCpuCount * 2;
> >> GhcbBase = AllocateReservedPages (GhcbPageCount);
> >> ASSERT (GhcbBase != NULL);
> >>
> >> GhcbBasePa = (PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN) GhcbBase;
> >>
> >> //
> >> // Each vCPU gets two consecutive pages, the first is the GHCB and the
> >> // second is the per-CPU variable page. Loop through the allocation and
> >> // only clear the encryption mask for the GHCB pages.
> >> //
> >> for (PageCount = 0; PageCount < GhcbPageCount; PageCount += 2) {
> >> DecryptStatus = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
> >> 0,
> >> GhcbBasePa + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (PageCount),
> >> 1,
> >> TRUE
> >> );
> >> ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (DecryptStatus);
> >> }
> >>
> >> ZeroMem (GhcbBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
> >>
> >> PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbBase, GhcbBasePa);
> >> ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
> >> PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbSize, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
> >> ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
> >>
> >> DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO,
> >> "SEV-ES is enabled, %lu GHCB pages allocated starting at 0x%p\n",
> >> (UINT64)GhcbPageCount, GhcbBase));
> >>
> >> AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, GhcbBasePa);
> >
> > So what is the *actual* problem at OS runtime:
> >
> > - Is it that MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB still points at this PEI-phase *reserved*
> > memory allocation (and so when QemuFlashPtrWrite() tries to access it
> > during OS runtime, it doesn't have a runtime mapping for it)?
>
> At this point the GHCB MSR points to the OS GHCB, which isn't mapped by
> the page tables supplied by the OS and used by UEFI.
>
> >
> > - Or is it that the OS actively changes MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, pointing to a
> > memory area that the OS owns -- and *that* area is what
> > QemuFlashPtrWrite() cannot access at OS runtime?
>
> Correct.
>
> >
> > The first problem statement does *not* seem to apply, given -- again --
> > that the commit message says, "firmware is likely to use the GHCB of the
> > OS".
> >
> > So I think the second problem statement must apply.
> >
> > (I think the "reserved allocation" above is "reserved" only because we
> > want to keep the OS out of it around the ExitBootServices() transition.)
> >
> > Back to the email:
> >
> > On 09/09/20 10:27, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 20:46, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Sep 07, 2020 at 03:16:12PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> >>>> so each GHCB in the system needs to be identity
> >>>> mapped in the EFI page tables, as unencrypted, to avoid page faults.
> >
> > Not sure I agree about this, but at least it seems to confirm my
> > understanding -- apparently the idea is, for the OS, to satisfy
> > QemuFlashPtrWrite() in the firmware, by putting the "expected" mapping
> > -- for wherever MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB is going to point to -- in place.
> >
> >>>>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> >>>> [ jroedel@...e.de: Moved GHCB mapping loop to sev-es.c ]
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
> >>
> >>
> >> This looks like it is papering over a more fundamental issue: any
> >> memory region that the firmware itself needs to access during the
> >> execution of runtime services needs to be described in the UEFI memory
> >> map, with the appropriate annotations so that the OS knows it should
> >> include these in the EFI runtime page tables. So why has this been
> >> omitted in this case?
> >
> > So yeah, the issue seems to be that the QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe
> > driver does not *own* the GHCB that it attempts to use at OS runtime. It
> > doesn't know where MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB is going to point.
> >
> > Is QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe permitted to change MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB
> > *temporarily* at OS runtime?
> >
> > Because, in that case:
> >
> > - QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe should allocate a Runtime Services Data
> > block for GHCB when it starts up (if SEV-ES is active),
> >
> > - QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe should register a SetVirtualAddressMap
> > handler, and use EfiConvertPointer() from UefiRuntimeLib to convert
> > the "runtime GHCB" address to virtual address, in that handler,
> >
> > - QemuFlashPtrWrite() should call EfiAtRuntime() from UefiRuntimeLib,
> > and if the latter returns TRUE, then (a) use the runtime-converted
> > address for populating the GHCB, and (b) temporarily swap
> > MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB with the address of the self-allocated GHCB. (The MSR
> > needs a *physical* address, so QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe would
> > have to remember / retain the original (physical) allocation address
> > too.)
> >
> > If QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe is not permitted to change
> > MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB even temporarily (at OS runtime), then I think the
> > approach proposed in this (guest kernel) patch is valid.
> >
> > Let me skim the code below...
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>> ---
> >>>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c | 1 +
> >>>> arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 2 ++
> >>>> arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>>> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 10 ++++++++++
> >>>> 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
> >>>> index 45702b866c33..0a9a248ca33d 100644
> >>>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
> >>>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
> >>>> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> >>>> */
> >>>> #include "misc.h"
> >>>>
> >>>> +#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
> >>>> #include <asm/sev-es.h>
> >>>> #include <asm/trapnr.h>
> >>>> #include <asm/trap_pf.h>
> >>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
> >>>> index e919f09ae33c..cf1d957c7091 100644
> >>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
> >>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
> >>>> @@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ static __always_inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
> >>>> if (static_branch_unlikely(&sev_es_enable_key))
> >>>> __sev_es_nmi_complete();
> >>>> }
> >>>> +extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd);
> >>>> #else
> >>>> static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
> >>>> static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
> >>>> static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
> >>>> static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
> >>>> +static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
> >>>> #endif
> >>>>
> >>>> #endif
> >>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> >>>> index 9ab3a4dfecd8..4e2b7e4d9b87 100644
> >>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> >>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
> >>>> @@ -491,6 +491,36 @@ int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
> >>>> return 0;
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>>> +/*
> >>>> + * This is needed by the OVMF UEFI firmware which will use whatever it finds in
> >>>> + * the GHCB MSR as its GHCB to talk to the hypervisor. So make sure the per-cpu
> >>>> + * runtime GHCBs used by the kernel are also mapped in the EFI page-table.
> >
> > Yup, this pretty much confirms my suspicion that QemuFlashPtrWrite() is
> > at the center of this.
> >
> > (BTW, I don't think that the runtime services data allocation, in
> > QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe, for OS runtime GHCB purposes, would have
> > to be "per CPU". Refer to "Table 35. Rules for Reentry Into Runtime
> > Services" in the UEFI spec -- if one processor is executing
> > SetVariable(), then no other processor must enter SetVariable(). And so
> > we'll have *at most* one VCPU in QemuFlashPtrWrite(), at any time.)
> >
> >>>> + */
> >>>> +int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
> >>>> + unsigned long address, pflags;
> >>>> + int cpu;
> >>>> + u64 pfn;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + if (!sev_es_active())
> >>>> + return 0;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + pflags = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> >>>> + data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
> >>>> +
> >>>> + address = __pa(&data->ghcb_page);
> >>>> + pfn = address >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, address, 1, pflags))
> >>>> + return 1;
> >>>> + }
> >>>> +
> >>>> + return 0;
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> >>>> {
> >>>> struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
> >>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> >>>> index 6af4da1149ba..8f5759df7776 100644
> >>>> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> >>>> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> >>>> @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
> >>>> #include <asm/realmode.h>
> >>>> #include <asm/time.h>
> >>>> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> >>>> +#include <asm/sev-es.h>
> >>>>
> >>>> /*
> >>>> * We allocate runtime services regions top-down, starting from -4G, i.e.
> >>>> @@ -229,6 +230,15 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
> >>>> return 1;
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>>> + /*
> >>>> + * When SEV-ES is active, the GHCB as set by the kernel will be used
> >>>> + * by firmware. Create a 1:1 unencrypted mapping for each GHCB.
> >>>> + */
> >>>> + if (sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd)) {
> >>>> + pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the GHCBs!\n");
> >>>> + return 1;
> >>>> + }
> >>>> +
> >>>> /*
> >>>> * When making calls to the firmware everything needs to be 1:1
> >>>> * mapped and addressable with 32-bit pointers. Map the kernel
> >
> > Good point!
> >
> > And it even makes me wonder if the QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe
> > approach, with the runtime services data type memory allocation, is
> > feasible at all. Namely, a page's encryption status, under SEV, is
> > controlled through the PTE.
> >
> > And for this particular UEFI runtime area, it would *not* suffice for
> > the OS to just virt-map it. The OS would also have to *decrypt* the area
> > (mark the PTE as "plaintext").
> >
> > In other words, it would be an "unprecedented" PTE for the OS to set up:
> > the PTE would not only map the GVA to GPA, but also mark the area as
> > "plaintext".
> >
> > Otherwise -- if the OS covers *just* the virt-mapping --,
> > QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe would populate its own "runtime GHCB"
> > area just fine, but the actual data hitting the host RAM would be
> > encrypted. And so the hypervisor could not interpret the GHCB.
> >
> > *If* QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe should not change the kernel-owned
> > PTE at runtime, even temporarily, for marking the GHCB as "plaintext",
> > then the problem is indeed only solvable in the guest kernel, in my
> > opinion.
> >
> > There simply isn't an "architected annotation" for telling the kernel,
> > "virt-map this runtime services data type memory range, *and* mark it as
> > plaintext at the same time".
> >
> > This would be necessary, as both actions affect the exact same PTE, and
> > the firmware is not really allowed to touch the PTE at runtime. But we
> > don't have such a hint.
> >
> >
> > To summarize: for QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe to allocate UEFI
> > Runtime Services Data type memory, for its own runtime GHCB, two
> > permissions are necessary (together), at OS runtime:
> >
> > - QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe must be allowed to swap MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB
> > temporarily (before executing VMGEXIT),
> >
> > - QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe must be allowed to change the OS-owned
> > PTE temporarily (for remapping the GHCB as plaintext, before writing
> > to it).
> >
>
> Amazing summarization Laszlo!
>
Agreed. And thanks a lot for taking the time to do the analysis.
Based on the above,
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Thanks,
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