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Date:   Fri, 11 Sep 2020 15:00:54 +0200
From:   Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To:     Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc:     Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Qian Cai <cai@....pw>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 06/10] kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASAN

On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 at 09:05, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 3:41 PM Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> >
> > We make KFENCE compatible with KASAN for testing KFENCE itself. In
> > particular, KASAN helps to catch any potential corruptions to KFENCE
> > state, or other corruptions that may be a result of freepointer
> > corruptions in the main allocators.
> >
> > To indicate that the combination of the two is generally discouraged,
> > CONFIG_EXPERT=y should be set. It also gives us the nice property that
> > KFENCE will be build-tested by allyesconfig builds.
> >
> > Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> > ---
> >  lib/Kconfig.kfence | 2 +-
> >  mm/kasan/common.c  | 7 +++++++
> >  2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
> > index 7ac91162edb0..b080e49e15d4 100644
> > --- a/lib/Kconfig.kfence
> > +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
> > @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE_STATIC_POOL
> >
> >  menuconfig KFENCE
> >         bool "KFENCE: low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector"
> > -       depends on HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE && !KASAN && (SLAB || SLUB)
> > +       depends on HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE && (!KASAN || EXPERT) && (SLAB || SLUB)
> >         depends on JUMP_LABEL # To ensure performance, require jump labels
> >         select STACKTRACE
> >         help
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > index 950fd372a07e..f5c49f0fdeff 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/init.h>
> >  #include <linux/kasan.h>
> >  #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > +#include <linux/kfence.h>
> >  #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
> >  #include <linux/linkage.h>
> >  #include <linux/memblock.h>
> > @@ -396,6 +397,9 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> >         tagged_object = object;
> >         object = reset_tag(object);
> >
> > +       if (is_kfence_address(object))
> > +               return false;
>
> Is this needed?
> At least in the slab patch I see that we do :
>
> if (kfence_free(objp)) {
>   kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
>   return;
> }
>
> before:
>
> /* Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */ /*
> Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */
> if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, _RET_IP_)) if
> (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, _RET_IP_))
>   return; return;
>
>
> If it's not supposed to be triggered, it can make sense to replace
> with BUG/WARN.

It is required for SLUB. For SLAB, it seems it might not be necessary.
Making the check in kasan/common.c conditional on the allocator seems
ugly, so I propose we keep it there.

Thanks,
-- Marco

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