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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+b-RPYpqErLVPh+qtiuv_LhCyxLE_DJqbM0jegFd_nOKQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 11 Sep 2020 09:14:10 +0200
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:     Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc:     Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Qian Cai <cai@....pw>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 09/10] kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 3:41 PM Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> Add KFENCE documentation in dev-tools/kfence.rst, and add to index.
>
> Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst  |   1 +
>  Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 285 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 286 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
> index f7809c7b1ba9..1b1cf4f5c9d9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ whole; patches welcome!
>     ubsan
>     kmemleak
>     kcsan
> +   kfence
>     gdb-kernel-debugging
>     kgdb
>     kselftest
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..254f4f089104
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE)
> +==============================
> +
> +Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety
> +error detector. KFENCE detects heap out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, and
> +invalid-free errors.
> +
> +KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near zero
> +performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for
> +precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with enough
> +total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by
> +non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total
> +uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large fleet of machines.
> +
> +Usage
> +-----
> +
> +To enable KFENCE, configure the kernel with::
> +
> +    CONFIG_KFENCE=y
> +
> +KFENCE provides several other configuration options to customize behaviour (see
> +the respective help text in ``lib/Kconfig.kfence`` for more info).
> +
> +Tuning performance
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +
> +The most important parameter is KFENCE's sample interval, which can be set via
> +the kernel boot parameter ``kfence.sample_interval`` in milliseconds. The
> +sample interval determines the frequency with which heap allocations will be
> +guarded by KFENCE. The default is configurable via the Kconfig option
> +``CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL``. Setting ``kfence.sample_interval=0``
> +disables KFENCE.
> +
> +With the Kconfig option ``CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS`` (default 255), the number
> +of available guarded objects can be controlled. Each object requires 2 pages,
> +one for the object itself and the other one used as a guard page; object pages
> +are interleaved with guard pages, and every object page is therefore surrounded
> +by two guard pages.
> +
> +The total memory dedicated to the KFENCE memory pool can be computed as::
> +
> +    ( #objects + 1 ) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE
> +
> +Using the default config, and assuming a page size of 4 KiB, results in
> +dedicating 2 MiB to the KFENCE memory pool.
> +
> +Error reports
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +
> +A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
> +
> +    ==================================================================
> +    BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds in test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa3/0x22b
> +
> +    Out-of-bounds access at 0xffffffffb672efff (left of kfence-#17):
> +     test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa3/0x22b
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    kfence-#17 [0xffffffffb672f000-0xffffffffb672f01f, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated in:
> +     __kfence_alloc+0x42d/0x4c0
> +     __kmalloc+0x133/0x200
> +     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
> +     test_out_of_bounds_read+0x98/0x22b
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    CPU: 4 PID: 107 Comm: kunit_try_catch Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #7
> +    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
> +    ==================================================================
> +
> +The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
> +the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
> +its origin.
> +
> +Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
> +
> +    ==================================================================
> +    BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free in test_use_after_free_read+0xb3/0x143
> +
> +    Use-after-free access at 0xffffffffb673dfe0:
> +     test_use_after_free_read+0xb3/0x143
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    kfence-#24 [0xffffffffb673dfe0-0xffffffffb673dfff, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated in:
> +     __kfence_alloc+0x277/0x4c0
> +     __kmalloc+0x133/0x200
> +     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
> +     test_use_after_free_read+0x76/0x143
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Empty line between stacks for consistency and readability.

> +    freed in:
> +     kfence_guarded_free+0x158/0x380
> +     __kfence_free+0x38/0xc0
> +     test_use_after_free_read+0xa8/0x143
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    CPU: 4 PID: 109 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
> +    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
> +    ==================================================================
> +
> +KFENCE also reports on invalid frees, such as double-frees::
> +
> +    ==================================================================
> +    BUG: KFENCE: invalid free in test_double_free+0xdc/0x171
> +
> +    Invalid free of 0xffffffffb6741000:
> +     test_double_free+0xdc/0x171
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    kfence-#26 [0xffffffffb6741000-0xffffffffb674101f, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated in:
> +     __kfence_alloc+0x42d/0x4c0
> +     __kmalloc+0x133/0x200
> +     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
> +     test_double_free+0x76/0x171
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +    freed in:
> +     kfence_guarded_free+0x158/0x380
> +     __kfence_free+0x38/0xc0
> +     test_double_free+0xa8/0x171
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    CPU: 4 PID: 111 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
> +    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
> +    ==================================================================
> +
> +KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones on the other side of an object's guard
> +page, to detect out-of-bounds writes on the unprotected side of the object.
> +These are reported on frees::
> +
> +    ==================================================================
> +    BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption in test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0xef/0x184
> +
> +    Detected corrupted memory at 0xffffffffb6797ff9 [ 0xac . . . . . . ]:
> +     test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0xef/0x184
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    kfence-#69 [0xffffffffb6797fb0-0xffffffffb6797ff8, size=73, cache=kmalloc-96] allocated in:
> +     __kfence_alloc+0x277/0x4c0
> +     __kmalloc+0x133/0x200
> +     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
> +     test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0x57/0x184
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    CPU: 4 PID: 120 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
> +    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
> +    ==================================================================
> +
> +For such errors, the address where the corruption as well as the corrupt bytes
> +are shown.
> +
> +And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page
> +where it was not possible to determine an associated object, e.g. if adjacent
> +object pages had not yet been allocated::
> +
> +    ==================================================================
> +    BUG: KFENCE: invalid access in test_invalid_access+0x26/0xe0
> +
> +    Invalid access at 0xffffffffb670b00a:
> +     test_invalid_access+0x26/0xe0
> +     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
> +     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
> +     kthread+0x137/0x160
> +     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> +
> +    CPU: 4 PID: 124 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
> +    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
> +    ==================================================================
> +
> +DebugFS interface
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +
> +Some debugging information is exposed via debugfs:
> +
> +* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kfence/stats`` provides runtime statistics.
> +
> +* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects`` provides a list of objects
> +  allocated via KFENCE, including those already freed but protected.
> +
> +Implementation Details
> +----------------------
> +
> +Guarded allocations are set up based on the sample interval. After expiration
> +of the sample interval, a guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool is
> +returned to the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB). At this point, the timer is
> +reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval.
> +To "gate" a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's fast-path without
> +overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the static keys infrastructure.
> +The static branch is toggled to redirect the allocation to KFENCE.
> +
> +KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or right

Do we mention anywhere explicitly that KFENCE currently only supports
allocations <=page_size?
May be worth mentioning. It kinda follows from implementation but
quite implicitly. One may also be confused assuming KFENCE handles
larger allocations, but then not being able to figure out.

> +page boundaries selected at random. The pages to the left and right of the
> +object page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
> +state, and cause page faults on any attempted access. Such page faults are then
> +intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault gracefully by reporting an
> +out-of-bounds access. The side opposite of an object's guard page is used as a
> +pattern-based redzone, to detect out-of-bounds writes on the unprotected sed of
> +the object on frees (for special alignment and size combinations, both sides of
> +the object are redzoned).
> +
> +KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones on the other side of an object's guard
> +page, to detect out-of-bounds writes on the unprotected side of the object;
> +these are reported on frees.
> +
> +The following figure illustrates the page layout::
> +
> +    ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
> +       | xxxxxxxxx | O :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : O | xxxxxxxxx |
> +       | xxxxxxxxx | B :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : B | xxxxxxxxx |
> +       | x GUARD x | J : RED-  | x GUARD x | RED-  : J | x GUARD x |
> +       | xxxxxxxxx | E :  ZONE | xxxxxxxxx |  ZONE : E | xxxxxxxxx |
> +       | xxxxxxxxx | C :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : C | xxxxxxxxx |
> +       | xxxxxxxxx | T :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : T | xxxxxxxxx |
> +    ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
> +
> +Upon deallocation of a KFENCE object, the object's page is again protected and
> +the object is marked as freed. Any further access to the object causes a fault
> +and KFENCE reports a use-after-free access. Freed objects are inserted at the
> +tail of KFENCE's freelist, so that the least recently freed objects are reused
> +first, and the chances of detecting use-after-frees of recently freed objects
> +is increased.
> +
> +Interface
> +---------
> +
> +The following describes the functions which are used by allocators as well page
> +handling code to set up and deal with KFENCE allocations.
> +
> +.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/kfence.h
> +   :functions: is_kfence_address
> +               kfence_shutdown_cache
> +               kfence_alloc kfence_free
> +               kfence_ksize kfence_object_start
> +               kfence_handle_page_fault
> +
> +Related Tools
> +-------------
> +
> +In userspace, a similar approach is taken by `GWP-ASan
> +<http://llvm.org/docs/GwpAsan.html>`_. GWP-ASan also relies on guard pages and
> +a sampling strategy to detect memory unsafety bugs at scale. KFENCE's design is
> +directly influenced by GWP-ASan, and can be seen as its kernel sibling. Another
> +similar but non-sampling approach, that also inspired the name "KFENCE", can be
> +found in the userspace `Electric Fence Malloc Debugger
> +<https://linux.die.net/man/3/efence>`_.
> +
> +In the kernel, several tools exist to debug memory access errors, and in
> +particular KASAN can detect all bug classes that KFENCE can detect. While KASAN
> +is more precise, relying on compiler instrumentation, this comes at a
> +performance cost. We want to highlight that KASAN and KFENCE are complementary,
> +with different target environments. For instance, KASAN is the better
> +debugging-aid, where a simple reproducer exists: due to the lower chance to
> +detect the error, it would require more effort using KFENCE to debug.
> +Deployments at scale, however, would benefit from using KFENCE to discover bugs
> +due to code paths not exercised by test cases or fuzzers.
> --
> 2.28.0.526.ge36021eeef-goog
>

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