linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] integrity: Load certs from EFI MOK config table

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Message-ID: <434085a28e9291dd799c1adbf08f003b7e5eb53d.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:01:11 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@...hat.com>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, andy.shevchenko@...il.com,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, serge@...lyn.com,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, prarit@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] integrity: Load certs from EFI MOK config table

On Fri, 2020-09-11 at 18:17 +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Sat, 5 Sep 2020 at 04:31, Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
> > variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
> > the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
> > list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
> > the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
> > this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.
> >
> > An EFI configuration table is a simpler and more robust mechanism
> > compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
> > of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.
> >
> > Entries in the MOK variable configuration table are named key/value
> > pairs. Therefore the shim boot loader can create a MokListRT named
> > entry in the MOK configuration table that contains exactly the same
> > data as the MokListRT UEFI variable does or would otherwise contain.
> > As such, the kernel can load certs from the data in the MokListRT
> > configuration table entry data in the same way that it loads certs
> > from the data returned by the EFI GetVariable() runtime call for the
> > MokListRT variable.
> >
> > This patch set does not remove the support for loading certs from the
> > EFI MOK variables into the platform key ring. However, if both the EFI
> > MOK configuration table and corresponding EFI MOK variables are present,
> > the MOK table is used as the source of MOK certs.
> >
> > The contents of the individual named MOK config table entries are
> > made available to user space as individual sysfs binary files,
> > which are read-only to root, under:
> >
> >         /sys/firmware/efi/mok-variables/
> >
> > This enables an updated mokutil to provide support for:
> >
> >         mokutil --list-enrolled
> >
> > such that it can provide accurate information regardless of whether
> > the MOK configuration table or MOK EFI variables were the source
> > for certs. Note that all modifications of MOK related state are still
> > initiated by mokutil via EFI variables.
> >
> > V2: Incorporate feedback from V1
> >   Patch 01: efi: Support for MOK variable config table
> >   - Minor update to change log; no code changes
> >   Patch 02: integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
> >   - Clean up code flow in code moved to load_moklist_certs()
> >   - Remove some unnecessary initialization of variables
> >   Patch 03: integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
> >   - Update required due to changes in patch 02.
> >   - Remove unnecessary init of mokvar_entry in load_moklist_certs()
> >
> > V1:
> >   https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200826034455.28707-1-lszubowi@redhat.com/
> >
> > Lenny Szubowicz (3):
> >   efi: Support for MOK variable config table
> >   integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
> >   integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
> >
> >  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c                       |   1 +
> >  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c                   |   3 +
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |   1 +
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c               |   1 +
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |   6 +
> >  drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c           | 360 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  include/linux/efi.h                           |  34 ++
> >  security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c |  85 ++++-
> >  8 files changed, 472 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c
> >
> 
> Thanks. I have tentatively queued these up in efi/next.
> 
> Mimi, please let me know if you have any thoughts on 3/3, and whether
> your R-b on 2/3 [v1] implies that you are ok with the series going
> through the EFI tree.

Yes, Ard, that was the intent.  I haven't reviewed the most recent
version.

Mimi