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Message-ID: <20200914175604.GF680@zn.tnic>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 19:56:04 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess
speculation
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 12:22:53PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> +/*
> + * Sanitize a user pointer such that it becomes NULL if it's not a valid user
> + * pointer. This prevents speculative dereferences of user-controlled pointers
> + * to kernel space when access_ok() speculatively returns true. This should be
> + * done *after* access_ok(), to avoid affecting error handling behavior.
Err, stupid question: can this macro then be folded into access_ok() so
that you don't have to touch so many places and the check can happen
automatically?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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