linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 15 Sep 2020 12:54:50 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@...fin.com>,
        Jordan Hand <jorhand@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
        Seth Moore <sethmo@...gle.com>,
        Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@...el.com>,
        akpm@...ux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com,
        asapek@...gle.com, bp@...en8.de, cedric.xing@...el.com,
        chenalexchen@...gle.com, conradparker@...gle.com,
        cyhanish@...gle.com, dave.hansen@...el.com, haitao.huang@...el.com,
        josh@...htriplett.org, kai.huang@...el.com, kai.svahn@...el.com,
        kmoy@...gle.com, ludloff@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
        nhorman@...hat.com, puiterwijk@...hat.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        tglx@...utronix.de, yaozhangx@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES

On Sun, Sep 13, 2020 at 09:56:03PM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote:
> 
> On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 07:40:08 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> ...
> 
> > +/**
> > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for
> > %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
> > + * @encl:       an enclave pointer
> > + * @arg:	a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
> > + *
> > + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally
> > extend the
> > + * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and
> > measurement mask
> > + * are applied to all pages.
> > + *
> > + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions
> > because
> > + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a
> > mismatch in
> > + * the measurement.
> > + *
> > + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For
> > each page
> > + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
> > + * heuristics:
> > + *
> > + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO
> > permissions.
> > + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
> > + *
> > + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum
> > protection bits
> > + * within the given address range.
> > + *
> > + * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been
> > invalidated.
> > + * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to
> > the
> > + * caller.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + *   length of the data processed on success,
> > + *   -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec
> > partition,
> > + *   -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
> > + *   -errno otherwise
> > + */
> > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void
> > __user *arg)
> > +{
> > +	struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
> > +	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> > +	unsigned long c;
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	if ((atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) ||
> > +	    !(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +	if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> > +	    !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +	if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
> > +			   sizeof(secinfo)))
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +	if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> > +		if (c == SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH || signal_pending(current)) {
> > +			ret = c;
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +		if (need_resched())
> > +			cond_resched();
> > +
> > +		ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
> > +					addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
> 
> no need passing addp.length - c?

True, it is cruft from the past.

I'll remove.

> 
> > +		if (ret)
> > +			break;
> 
> Some error cases here are fatal and should be passed back to user space so
> that it would not retry.

I don't comprehend this. 'ret' is passed to the user space.

> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp)))
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> 
> This copy no longer needed?

True, it is cruft from the past.

I'll remove.

> > +	return c;
> > +}
> > +
> 
> Thanks
> Haitao

Thanks for the comments.

/Jarkko