linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 08/35] KVM: SVM: Prevent debugging under SEV-ES

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Message-ID: <20200915163010.GB8420@sjchrist-ice>
Date:   Tue, 15 Sep 2020 09:30:10 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 08/35] KVM: SVM: Prevent debugging under SEV-ES

On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 08:37:12AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 9/14/20 4:26 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Mon, Sep 14, 2020 at 03:15:22PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> >> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> >>
> >> Since the guest register state of an SEV-ES guest is encrypted, debugging
> >> is not supported. Update the code to prevent guest debugging when the
> >> guest is an SEV-ES guest. This includes adding a callable function that
> >> is used to determine if the guest supports being debugged.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> >> ---
> >>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 ++
> >>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> >>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |  7 +++++++
> >>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  3 +++
> >>  4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> >> index c900992701d6..3e2a3d2a8ba8 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> >> @@ -1234,6 +1234,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> >>  	void (*reg_read_override)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
> >>  	void (*reg_write_override)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg,
> >>  				   unsigned long val);
> >> +
> >> +	bool (*allow_debug)(struct kvm *kvm);
> > 
> > Why add both allow_debug() and vmsa_encrypted?  I assume there are scenarios
> > where allow_debug() != vmsa_encrypted?  E.g. is there a debug mode for SEV-ES
> > where the VMSA is not encrypted, but KVM (ironically) can't intercept #DBs or
> > something?
> 
> No, once the guest has had LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA run against the vCPUs, then
> the vCPU states are all encrypted. But that doesn't mean that debugging
> can't be done in the future.

I don't quite follow the "doesn't mean debugging can't be done in the future".
Does that imply that debugging could be supported for SEV-ES guests, even if
they have an encrypted VMSA?