linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework

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Date:   Thu, 17 Sep 2020 19:21:42 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc:     zohar@...ux.ibm.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
        jens.wiklander@...aro.org, corbet@....net, jmorris@...ei.org,
        serge@...lyn.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com, janne.karhunen@...il.com,
        daniel.thompson@...aro.org, Markus.Wamser@...ed-mode.de,
        lhinds@...hat.com, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework

On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 07:16:35PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> 
> So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> implementations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.

I would rephrase this a bit:

"Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend."

I remember asking about this approach that what if there was just a
header for trusted key functions and a compile time decision, which C
file to include instead of ops struct. I don't remember if these was a
conclusion on this or not.

E.g. lets say you have a device with TEE and TPM, should you be able
to be use both at run-time? I might play along how this works now but
somehow, in the commit message preferably, it should be conclude why
one alternative is chosen over another.

/Jarkko