linux-kernel - Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH] fs: fix KMSAN uninit-value bug by initializing nd in do_file_open

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Message-ID: <20200919144451.GF2712238@kroah.com>
Date:   Sat, 19 Sep 2020 16:44:51 +0200
From:   Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel-mentees@...ts.linuxfoundation.org,
        syzbot+4191a44ad556eacc1a7a@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH] fs: fix KMSAN uninit-value bug by
 initializing nd in do_file_open_root

On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 01:22:38AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 10:41:57PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> 
> > Looking at the actual KMSAN report, it looks like it's nameidata::dir_mode or
> > nameidata::dir_uid that is uninitialized.  You need to figure out the correct
> > solution, not just blindly initialize with zeroes -- that could hide a bug.
> > Is there a bug that is preventing these fields from being initialized to the
> > correct values, are these fields being used when they shouldn't be, etc...
> 
> False positive, and this is the wrong place to shut it up.
> 
> ->dir_uid and ->dir_mode are set when link_path_walk() resolves the pathname
> to directory + final component.  They are used when deciding whether to reject
> a trailing symlink (on fs.protected_symlinks setups) and whether to allow
> creation in sticky directories (on fs.protected_regular and fs.protected_fifos
> setups).  Both operations really need the results of successful link_path_walk().
> 
> I don't see how that could be not a false positive.  If we hit the use in
> may_create_in_sticky(), we'd need the combination of
> 	* pathname that consists only of slashes (or it will be initialized)
> 	* LAST_NORM in nd->last_type, which is flat-out impossible, since
> we are left with LAST_ROOT for such pathnames.  The same goes for
> may_follow_link() use - we need WALK_TRAILING in flags to hit it in the
> first place, which can come from two sources -
>         return walk_component(nd, WALK_TRAILING);
> in lookup_last() (and walk_component() won't go anywhere near the
> call chain leading to may_follow_link() without LAST_NORM in nd->last_type)
> and
>         res = step_into(nd, WALK_TRAILING, dentry, inode, seq);
> in open_last_lookups(), which also won't go anywhere near that line without
> LAST_NORM in the nd->last_type.
> 
> IOW, unless we manage to call that without having called link_path_walk()
> at all or after link_path_walk() returning an error, we shouldn't hit
> that.  And if we *do* go there without link_path_walk() or with an error
> from link_path_walk(), we have a much worse problem.
> 
> I want to see the details of reproducer.  If it's for real, we have a much
> more serious problem; if it's a false positive, the right place to deal
> with it would be elsewhere (perhaps on return from link_path_walk() with
> a slashes-only pathname), but in any case it should only be done after we
> manage to understand what's going on.

Reproducer is pretty simple:
	https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=13974b2f100000

Now if that is actually valid or not, I don't know...

thanks,

greg k-h