linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH 1/9] kernel: add a PF_FORCE

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Message-ID: <8363d874e503470f8caa201e85e9fbd4@AcuMS.aculab.com>
Date:   Sun, 20 Sep 2020 21:13:24 +0000
From:   David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
To:     'Arnd Bergmann' <arnd@...db.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
CC:     Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:MIPS" <linux-mips@...r.kernel.org>,
        Parisc List <linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org>,
        linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
        linux-s390 <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>,
        sparclinux <sparclinux@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-block <linux-block@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux SCSI List <linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-aio <linux-aio@...ck.org>,
        "io-uring@...r.kernel.org" <io-uring@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH 1/9] kernel: add a PF_FORCE_COMPAT flag

From: Arnd Bergmann
> Sent: 20 September 2020 21:49
> 
> On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 9:28 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> > On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 12:23 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 08:10:31PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> > > > IMO it's much saner to mark those and refuse to touch them from io_uring...
> > >
> > > Simpler solution is to remove io_uring from the 32-bit syscall list.
> > > If you're a 32-bit process, you don't get to use io_uring.  Would
> > > any real users actually care about that?
> >
> > We could go one step farther and declare that we're done adding *any*
> > new compat syscalls :)
> 
> Would you also stop adding system calls to native 32-bit systems then?
> 
> On memory constrained systems (less than 2GB a.t.m.), there is still a
> strong demand for running 32-bit user space, but all of the recent Arm
> cores (after Cortex-A55) dropped the ability to run 32-bit kernels, so
> that compat mode may eventually become the primary way to run
> Linux on cheap embedded systems.
> 
> I don't think there is any chance we can realistically take away io_uring
> from the 32-bit ABI any more now.

Can't it just run requests from 32bit apps in a kernel thread that has
the 'in_compat_syscall' flag set?
Not that i recall seeing the code where it saves the 'compat' nature
of any requests.

It is already completely f*cked if you try to pass the command ring
to a child process - it uses the wrong 'mm'.
I suspect there are some really horrid security holes in that area.

	David.

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