linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 03/10] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64

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Message-ID: <CAG_fn=WKaY9MVmbpkgoN4vaJYD_T_A3z2Lgqn+2o8-irmCKywg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:58:16 +0200
From:   Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc:     Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Hillf Danton <hdanton@...a.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan.Cameron@...wei.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, sjpark@...zon.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 03/10] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64

On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 4:31 PM Will Deacon <will@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 03:26:04PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> > Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
> > KFENCE for the arm64 architecture. In particular, this implements the
> > required interface in <asm/kfence.h>. Currently, the arm64 version does
> > not yet use a statically allocated memory pool, at the cost of a pointer
> > load for each is_kfence_address().
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> > ---
> > For ARM64, we would like to solicit feedback on what the best option is
> > to obtain a constant address for __kfence_pool. One option is to declare
> > a memory range in the memory layout to be dedicated to KFENCE (like is
> > done for KASAN), however, it is unclear if this is the best available
> > option. We would like to avoid touching the memory layout.
>
> Sorry for the delay on this.

NP, thanks for looking!

> Given that the pool is relatively small (i.e. when compared with our virtual
> address space), dedicating an area of virtual space sounds like it makes
> the most sense here. How early do you need it to be available?

Yes, having a dedicated address sounds good.
We're inserting kfence_init() into start_kernel() after timekeeping_init().
So way after mm_init(), if that matters.

> An alternative approach would be to patch in the address at runtime, with
> something like a static key to swizzle off the direct __kfence_pool load
> once we're up and running.

IIUC there's no such thing as address patching in the kernel at the
moment, at least static keys work differently?
I am not sure how much we need to randomize this address range (we
don't on x86 anyway).

> Will
>
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Alexander Potapenko
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