linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled

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Date:   Wed, 23 Sep 2020 15:07:33 -0700
From:   "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is
 enabled

On 9/23/2020 2:34 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 10:46 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 9/21/2020 4:48 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 3:37 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, 2020-09-21 at 09:22 -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>>>
>>>> Here is the patch:
>>>>
>>>> ------
>>>>
>>>>   From dfdee39c795ee5dcee2c77f6ba344a61f4d8124b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>>> From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
>>>> Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 14:15:38 -0800
>>>> Subject: [PATCH 34/43] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch
>>>>    Tracking for vsyscall emulation
>>>>
>>>> Vsyscall entry points are effectively branch targets.  Mark them with
>>>> ENDBR64 opcodes.  When emulating the RET instruction, unwind the shadow
>>>> stack and reset IBT state machine.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c     | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>    arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S |  9 +++++++
>>>>    arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_trace.h  |  1 +
>>>>    3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
>>>> b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
>>>> index 44c33103a955..0131c9f7f9c5 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
>>>> @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
>>>>    #include <asm/fixmap.h>
>>>>    #include <asm/traps.h>
>>>>    #include <asm/paravirt.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
>>>>
>>>>    #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
>>>>    #include "vsyscall_trace.h"
>>>> @@ -286,6 +289,32 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
>>>>           /* Emulate a ret instruction. */
>>>>           regs->ip = caller;
>>>>           regs->sp += 8;
>>>> +
>>>> +       if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size ||
>>>> +           current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
>>>> +               u64 r;
>>>> +
>>>> +               fpregs_lock();
>>>> +               if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
>>>> +                       __fpregs_load_activate();
>>>
>>> Wouldn't this be nicer if you operated on the memory image, not the registers?
>>
>> Do you mean writing to the XSAVES area?
> 
> Yes.
> 
>>
>>>
>>>> +
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
>>>> +               /* Fixup branch tracking */
>>>> +               if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
>>>> +                       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
>>>> +                       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r & ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
>>>> +               }
>>>> +#endif
>>>
>>> Seems reasonable on first glance.
>>>
>>>> +
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
>>>> +               /* Unwind shadow stack. */
>>>> +               if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size) {
>>>> +                       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r);
>>>> +                       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r + 8);
>>>> +               }
>>>> +#endif
>>>
>>> What happens if the result is noncanonical?  A quick skim of the SDM
>>> didn't find anything.  This latter issue goes away if you operate on
>>> the memory image, though -- writing a bogus value is just fine, since
>>> the FP restore will handle it.
>>>
>>
>> At this point, the MSR's value can still be valid or is already saved to
>> memory.  If we are going to write to memory, then the MSR must be saved
>> first.  So I chose to do __fpregs_load_activate() and write the MSR.
>>
>> Maybe we can check the address before writing it to the MSR?
> 
> Performance is almost irrelevant here, and the writing-to-XSAVES-area
> approach should have the benefit that the exception handling and
> signaling happens for free.
> 

Ok, I will change it.

Thanks,
Yu-cheng