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Message-ID: <0ccf42d8-2803-c1db-73f0-884d1ea27282@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 19:27:37 +0200
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>,
"kvm @ vger . kernel . org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
Lendacky Thomas <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Singh Brijesh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Grimm Jon <Jon.Grimm@....com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Mark SEV launch secret pages as dirty.
On 23/09/20 19:26, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> /*
> * Flush before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in place, in case the cache
> * contains the data that was written unencrypted.
> */
> sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
>
> there's nothing in the comment or code that even suggests sev_clflush_pages() is
> conditional, i.e. no reason for the reader to peek at the implemenation.
>
> What about:
>
> /*
> * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
> * place, the cache may contain data that was written unencrypted.
> */
Sounds good.
Paolo
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