[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQpto1KuL7PhjtdjtAjJ2nC+rZNSM7+nSZ_ksqGXbhY+Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 11:28:55 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Tom Hromatka <tom.hromatka@...cle.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@...inois.edu>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.pizza>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@...hat.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@...cmu.edu>,
Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@...hat.com>,
Hubertus Franke <frankeh@...ibm.com>,
Jack Chen <jianyan2@...inois.edu>,
Josep Torrellas <torrella@...inois.edu>,
Tianyin Xu <tyxu@...inois.edu>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 3:46 AM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 01:47:47AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 1:29 AM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> > > This emulates absolutely the most basic seccomp filters to figure out
> > > if they will always give the same results for a given arch/nr combo.
> > >
> > > Nearly all seccomp filters are built from the following ops:
> > >
> > > BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS
> > > BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K
> > > BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K
> > > BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K
> > > BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K
> > > BPF_JMP | BPF_JA
> > > BPF_RET | BPF_K
> > >
> > > These are now emulated to check for accesses beyond seccomp_data::arch
> > > or unknown instructions.
> > >
> > > Not yet implemented are:
> > >
> > > BPF_ALU | BPF_AND (generated by libseccomp and Chrome)
> >
> > BPF_AND is normally only used on syscall arguments, not on the syscall
> > number or the architecture, right? And when a syscall argument is
> > loaded, we abort execution anyway. So I think there is no need to
> > implement those?
>
> Is that right? I can't actually tell what libseccomp is doing with
> ALU|AND. It looks like it's using it for building jump lists?
There is an ALU|AND op in the jump resolution code, but that is really
just if libseccomp needs to fixup the accumulator because a code block
is expecting a masked value (right now that would only be a syscall
argument, not the syscall number itself).
> Paul, Tom, under what cases does libseccomp emit ALU|AND into filters?
Presently the only place where libseccomp uses ALU|AND is when the
masked equality comparison is used for comparing syscall arguments
(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ). I can't honestly say I have any good
information about how often that is used by libseccomp callers, but if
I do a quick search on GitHub for "SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ" I see 2k worth
of code hits; take that for whatever it is worth. Tom may have some
more/better information.
Of course no promises on future use :) As one quick example, I keep
thinking about adding the instruction pointer to the list of things
that can be compared as part of a libseccomp rule, and if we do that I
would expect that we would want to also allow a masked comparison (and
utilize another ALU|AND bpf op there). However, I'm not sure how
useful that would be in practice.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Powered by blists - more mailing lists