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Message-ID: <20200924215523.GA119995@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 00:55:23 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
asapek@...gle.com, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>, chenalexchen@...gle.com,
Conrad Parker <conradparker@...gle.com>, cyhanish@...gle.com,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
"Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, Keith Moyer <kmoy@...gle.com>,
Christian Ludloff <ludloff@...gle.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
Patrick Uiterwijk <puiterwijk@...hat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, yaozhangx@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect()
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 02:11:37PM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote:
> > For me this has caused months of confusion and misunderstanding of this
> > feature. I only recently realized that "oh, right, we invented this".
> >
> > They are contrived scenarios enough that they should be considered when
> > the workloads hit.
> >
> > Either we fully support noexec or not at all. Any "partial" thing is a
> > two edged sword: it can bring some robustness with the price of
> > complexity and possible unknown uknown scenarios where they might become
> > API issue.
> >
> > I rather think later on how to extend API in some way to enable such
> > contrivid scenarios rather than worrying about how this could be abused.
> >
> > The whole SGX is complex beast already so lets not add any extra when
> > there is no a hard requirement to do so.
> >
> > I'll categorically deny noexec in the next patch set version.
> >
> > /Jarkko
>
> There are use cases supported currently in which enclave binary is received
> via IPC/RPC and held in buffers before EADD. Denying noexec altogether would
> break those, right?
I do not see why data cannot be provided at run-time. AFAIK, it is not
different from executables how this works when it comes to noexec.
/Jarkko
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