linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v38 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call

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Message-ID: <CAMe9rOpzXW0cSD=9E7drGEHH=pcm_NqvPiaR0pBJzYLeAt0_3g@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 28 Sep 2020 11:07:47 -0700
From:   "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>
To:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@...el.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, asapek@...gle.com,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, chenalexchen@...gle.com,
        conradparker@...gle.com, cyhanish@...gle.com,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>, josh@...htriplett.org,
        kai.huang@...el.com, kai.svahn@...el.com, kmoy@...gle.com,
        Christian Ludloff <ludloff@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, nhorman@...hat.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, puiterwijk@...hat.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, yaozhangx@...gle.com,
        Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v38 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX
 enclave call

On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 9:44 AM Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com> wrote:
>
> On 28/09/2020 01:58, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 07:23:59PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >> On 15/09/2020 12:28, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> >>> new file mode 100644
> >>> index 000000000000..adbd59d41517
> >>> --- /dev/null
> >>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> >>> @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
> >>> +SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
> >>> <snip>
> >>> +.Lretpoline:
> >>> +   call    2f
> >>> +1: pause
> >>> +   lfence
> >>> +   jmp     1b
> >>> +2: mov     %rax, (%rsp)
> >>> +   ret
> >> I hate to throw further spanners in the work, but this is not compatible
> >> with CET, and the user shadow stack work in progress.
> > CET goes beyond my expertise. Can you describe, at least rudimentary,
> > how this code is not compatible?
>
> CET Shadow Stacks detect attacks which modify the return address on the
> stack.
>
> Retpoline *is* a ROP gadget.  It really does modify the return address
> on the stack, even if its purpose is defensive (vs Spectre v2) rather
> than malicious.
>
> >> Whichever of these two large series lands first is going to inflict
> >> fixing this problem on the other.
> >>
> >> As the vdso text is global (to a first approximation), it must not be a
> >> retpoline if any other process is liable to want to use CET-SS.
> > Why is that?
>
> Because when CET-SS is enabled, the ret will suffer a #CP exception
> (return address on the stack not matching the one recorded in the shadow
> stack), which I presume/hope is wired into SIGSEGV.
>

Here is the CET compatible retpoline:

endbr64
/* Check if shadow stack is in use.  NB: R11 is the only usable
   scratch register for function calls.  */
xorl %r11d, %r11d
rdsspq %r11
testq %r11, %r11
jnz 3f
call 2f
1:
pause
lfence
jmp 1b
2:
mov %rax, (%rsp)
ret
3:
/* Shadow stack is in use.  Make the indirect call.  */
call *%rax
ret


-- 
H.J.