linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v38 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call

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Message-ID: <CAMe9rOoyxtf_kUCdb-TN+NmZsQNmFY8NLMObSdCB5bBVq1x+cQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 28 Sep 2020 15:06:35 -0700
From:   "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@...el.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        asapek@...gle.com, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        chenalexchen@...gle.com, Conrad Parker <conradparker@...gle.com>,
        cyhanish@...gle.com, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, Keith Moyer <kmoy@...gle.com>,
        Christian Ludloff <ludloff@...gle.com>,
        Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
        Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
        Patrick Uiterwijk <puiterwijk@...hat.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, yaozhangx@...gle.com,
        Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v38 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX
 enclave call

On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 2:56 PM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 11:12:08AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 11:08 AM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@...il.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 9:44 AM Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 28/09/2020 01:58, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 07:23:59PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > > > >> On 15/09/2020 12:28, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> > > > >>> new file mode 100644
> > > > >>> index 000000000000..adbd59d41517
> > > > >>> --- /dev/null
> > > > >>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> > > > >>> @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
> > > > >>> +SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
> > > > >>> <snip>
> > > > >>> +.Lretpoline:
> > > > >>> +   call    2f
> > > > >>> +1: pause
> > > > >>> +   lfence
> > > > >>> +   jmp     1b
> > > > >>> +2: mov     %rax, (%rsp)
> > > > >>> +   ret
> > > > >> I hate to throw further spanners in the work, but this is not compatible
> > > > >> with CET, and the user shadow stack work in progress.
> > > > > CET goes beyond my expertise. Can you describe, at least rudimentary,
> > > > > how this code is not compatible?
> > > >
> > > > CET Shadow Stacks detect attacks which modify the return address on the
> > > > stack.
> > > >
> > > > Retpoline *is* a ROP gadget.  It really does modify the return address
> > > > on the stack, even if its purpose is defensive (vs Spectre v2) rather
> > > > than malicious.
> > > >
> > > > >> Whichever of these two large series lands first is going to inflict
> > > > >> fixing this problem on the other.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> As the vdso text is global (to a first approximation), it must not be a
> > > > >> retpoline if any other process is liable to want to use CET-SS.
> > > > > Why is that?
> > > >
> > > > Because when CET-SS is enabled, the ret will suffer a #CP exception
> > > > (return address on the stack not matching the one recorded in the shadow
> > > > stack), which I presume/hope is wired into SIGSEGV.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Here is the CET compatible retpoline:
> > >
> > > endbr64
> > > /* Check if shadow stack is in use.  NB: R11 is the only usable
> > >    scratch register for function calls.  */
> > > xorl %r11d, %r11d
> > > rdsspq %r11
> > > testq %r11, %r11
> > > jnz 3f
> > > call 2f
> > > 1:
> > > pause
> > > lfence
> > > jmp 1b
> > > 2:
> > > mov %rax, (%rsp)
> > > ret
> > > 3:
> > > /* Shadow stack is in use.  Make the indirect call.  */
> > > call *%rax
> > > ret
> >
> > What do we expect user programs to do on CET systems?  It would be
> > nice if we could instead ALTERNATIVE this out if X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.
> >
> > --Andy
>
> I'm open to do either solution. My thinking was to initially do things
> vsgx.S local (i.e. consider ALTERNATIVE post upstreaming) and use the
> above solution but I'm also fine doing ALTERNATIVE. Dave kindly briefed
> on details how that thing works and it should be perfectly usable for
> our use case.
>

Since SHSTK and IBT are enabled per process, not the whole machine,
are you going to patch vDSO on a per-process basis?

-- 
H.J.