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Message-ID: <9b700b03-6bbd-b969-abb8-a004c813446d@amazon.com>
Date:   Thu, 1 Oct 2020 08:59:48 +1000
From:   "Singh, Balbir" <sblbir@...zon.com>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
CC:     Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@...il.com>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com" 
        <clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com>,
        "kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org" <kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-safety@...ts.elisa.tech" <linux-safety@...ts.elisa.tech>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next for tip:x86/pti] x86/tlb: drop unneeded local vars in
 enable_l1d_flush_for_task()

On 1/10/20 7:38 am, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Sep 30 2020 at 20:35, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 08:00:59PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>> On Wed, Sep 30 2020 at 19:03, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 05:40:08PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>>> Also, that preempt_disable() in there doesn't actually do anything.
>>>> Worse, preempt_disable(); for_each_cpu(); is an anti-pattern. It mixes
>>>> static_cpu_has() and boot_cpu_has() in the same bloody condition and has
>>>> a pointless ret variable.
>>
>> Also, I forgot to add, it accesses ->cpus_mask without the proper
>> locking, so it could be reading intermediate state from whatever cpumask
>> operation that's in progress.
> 
> Yes. I saw that after hitting send. :(
> 
>>> I absolutely agree and I really missed it when looking at it before
>>> merging. cpus_read_lock()/unlock() is the right thing to do if at all.
>>>
>>>> It's shoddy code, that only works if you align the planets right. We
>>>> really shouldn't provide interfaces that are this bad.
>>>>
>>>> It's correct operation is only by accident.
>>>
>>> True :(
>>>
>>> I understand Balbirs problem and it makes some sense to provide a
>>> solution. We can:
>>>
>>>     1) reject set_affinity() if the task has that flush muck enabled
>>>        and user space tries to move it to a SMT enabled core
>>>
>>>     2) disable the muck if if detects that it is runs on a SMT enabled
>>>        core suddenly (hotplug says hello)
>>>
>>>        This one is nasty because there is no feedback to user space
>>>        about the wreckage.
>>
>> That's and, right, not or. because 1) deals with sched_setffinity()
>> and 2) deals wit hotplug.
> 
> It was meant as AND of course.
> 
>> Now 1) requires an arch hook in sched_setaffinity(), something I'm not
>> keen on providing, once we provide it, who knows what strange and
>> wonderful things archs will dream up.
> 
> I don't think so. We can have that magic in core:
> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH
> static bool paranoid_l1d_valid(struct task_struct *tsk,
>                                const struct cpumask *msk)
> {
>         if (!test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH))
>                 return true;
>         /* Do magic stuff */
>         return res;
> }
> #else
> static bool paranoid_l1d_valid(struct task_struct *tsk,
>                                const struct cpumask *msk)
> {
>         return true;
> }
> #endif
> 
> It's a pretty well defined problem and having the magic in core code
> prevents an arch hook which allows abuse of all sorts.
> 
> And the same applies to enable_l1d_flush_for_task(). The only
> architecture specific nonsense are the checks whether the CPU bug is
> there and whether the hardware supports L1D flushing.
> 
> So we can have:
> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH
> int paranoid_l1d_enable(struct task_struct *tsk)
> {
>         /* Do the SMT validation under the proper locks */
>         if (!res)
>                 set_task_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);
>         return res;
> }
> #endif
> 
>> And 2) also happens on hot-un-plug, when the task's affinity gets
>> forced because it became empty. No user feedback there either, and
>> information is lost.
> 
> Of course. It's both that suddenly SMT gets enabled on a core which was
> isolated and when the last isolated core in the tasks CPU mask goes
> offline.
> 
>> I suppose we can do 2) but send a signal. That would cover all cases and
>> keep it in arch code. But yes, that's pretty terrible too.
> 
> Bah. I just looked at the condition to flush:
> 
>         if (sched_smt_active() && !this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active) &&
>                 (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH))
>                 l1d_flush_hw();
> 
> That fails to flush when SMT is disabled globally. Balbir?

It should have been 

!sched_smt_active() || (cond)

and not

sched_smt_active && (cond)

I'll fix that up, but your simplification below works as well.




> 
> Of course this should be:
> 
>         if (!this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active) && (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH))
>                 l1d_flush_hw();
> 
> Now we can make this:
> 
>         if (unlikely(prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)) {
>                 if (!this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active))
>                         l1d_flush_hw();
>                 else
>                         task_work_add(...);
> 
> And that task work clears the flag and sends a signal. We're not going
> to send a signal from switch_mm() ....
> 

Yes, I see MCE handling uses a similar pattern, so SIGBUS for a task that migrates/moves
to a SMT disabled core?

Thanks,
Balbir

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