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Message-ID: <20200930061153.GA738306@jade>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 08:11:53 +0200
From: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
To: Elvira Khabirova <e.khabirova@...russia.ru>
Cc: op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
vesa.jaaskelainen@...sala.com, s.shtylyov@...russia.ru,
k.karasev@...russia.ru
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] tee: add support for application-based session login
methods
On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 05:01:01AM +0300, Elvira Khabirova wrote:
> On Mon, 28 Sep 2020 15:43:47 +0200
> Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org> wrote:
>
> > Hi Elvira,
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 06:38:03PM +0300, Elvira Khabirova wrote:
> > > GP TEE Client API in addition to login methods already supported
> > > in the kernel also defines several application-based methods:
> > > TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION, TEEC_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION, and
> > > TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION.
> > >
> > > It specifies credentials generated for TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION as only
> > > depending on the identity of the program, being persistent within one
> > > implementation, across multiple invocations of the application
> > > and across power cycles, enabling them to be used to disambiguate
> > > persistent storage. The exact nature is REE-specific.
> > >
> > > As the exact method of generating application identifier strings may
> > > vary between vendors, setups and installations, add two suggested
> > > methods and an exact framework for vendors to extend upon.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Elvira Khabirova <e.khabirova@...russia.ru>
> > > ---
> > > drivers/tee/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++
> > > drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 136 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > 2 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/drivers/tee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/Kconfig
> > > index e99d840c2511..4cd6e0d2aad5 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/tee/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/drivers/tee/Kconfig
> > > @@ -11,6 +11,35 @@ config TEE
> > > This implements a generic interface towards a Trusted Execution
> > > Environment (TEE).
> > >
> > > +choice
> > > + prompt "Application ID for client UUID"
> > > + depends on TEE
> > > + default TEE_APPID_PATH
> > > + help
> > > + This option allows to choose which method will be used to generate
> > > + application identifiers for client UUID generation when login methods
> > > + TEE_LOGIN_APPLICATION, TEE_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION
> > > + and TEE_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION are used.
> > > + Please be mindful of the security of each method in your particular
> > > + installation.
> > > +
> > > + config TEE_APPID_PATH
> > > + bool "Path-based application ID"
> > > + help
> > > + Use the executable's path as an application ID.
> > > +
> > > + config TEE_APPID_SECURITY
> > > + bool "Security extended attribute based application ID"
> > > + help
> > > + Use the executable's security extended attribute as an application ID.
> > > +endchoice
> > > +
> > > +config TEE_APPID_SECURITY_XATTR
> > > + string "Security extended attribute to use for application ID"
> > > + depends on TEE_APPID_SECURITY
> > > + help
> > > + Attribute to be used as an application ID (with the security prefix removed).
> > > +
> > > if TEE
> > >
> > > menu "TEE drivers"
> > > diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
> > > index 64637e09a095..19c965dd212b 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
> > > @@ -7,8 +7,10 @@
> > >
> > > #include <linux/cdev.h>
> > > #include <linux/cred.h>
> > > +#include <linux/file.h>
> > > #include <linux/fs.h>
> > > #include <linux/idr.h>
> > > +#include <linux/mm.h>
> > > #include <linux/module.h>
> > > #include <linux/slab.h>
> > > #include <linux/tee_drv.h>
> > > @@ -17,11 +19,15 @@
> > > #include <crypto/sha.h>
> > > #include "tee_private.h"
> > >
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY
> > No need for the ifdef, just inlude the file unconditionally above.
> >
> > > +#include <linux/security.h>
> > > +#endif
> > > +
> > > #define TEE_NUM_DEVICES 32
> > >
> > > #define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x))
> > >
> > > -#define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE 128
> > > +#define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE PATH_MAX
> > >
> > > /*
> > > * TEE Client UUID name space identifier (UUIDv4)
> > > @@ -125,6 +131,67 @@ static int tee_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY
> > > +static const char *tee_session_get_application_id(void **data)
> > static char *get_app_id(void) should be enough.
> >
> > > +{
> > > + struct file *exe_file;
> > > + const char *name = CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY_XATTR;
> > > + int len;
> > > +
> > > + exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm);
> > > + if (!exe_file)
> > > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> > > +
> > > + if (!exe_file->f_inode) {
> > > + fput(exe_file);
> > > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> > > + }
> > > +
> >
> > You could perhaps add a comment here on the expected properties of this
> > data. Something along (don't know if I'm even close) "string
> > representation of the the hash of the binary and time stamp".
> >
> > > + len = security_inode_getsecurity(exe_file->f_inode, name, data, true);
> > > + if (len < 0)
> > > + return ERR_PTR(len);
> > > +
> > > + fput(exe_file);
> > > +
> > > + return *data;
> > > +}
> > > +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY */
> > > +
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH
> > > +static const char *tee_session_get_application_id(void **data)
> > > +{
> > > + struct file *exe_file;
> > > + char *path;
> > > +
> > > + *data = kzalloc(TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > + if (!*data)
> > > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > > +
> > > + exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm);
> > > + if (!exe_file) {
> > > + kfree(*data);
> > > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + path = file_path(exe_file, *data, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(path)) {
> > > + kfree(*data);
> > > + return path;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + fput(exe_file);
> > > +
> > > + return path;
> > > +}
> > > +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH */
> > > +
> > > +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH) || defined(CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY)
> > > +static void tee_session_free_application_id(void *data)
> > > +{
> > > + kfree(data);
> > > +}
> > This function isn't needed, we can call kfree() directly.
> >
> > > +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH || CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY */
> > > +
> > > /**
> > > * uuid_v5() - Calculate UUIDv5
> > > * @uuid: Resulting UUID
> > > @@ -197,6 +264,8 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method,
> > > gid_t ns_grp = (gid_t)-1;
> > > kgid_t grp = INVALID_GID;
> > > char *name = NULL;
> > > + void *application_id_data = NULL;
> > This isn't needed
> The only reason application_id_data exists (and get_application_id has a parameter)
> is because when defined(CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH), file_path() returns a pointer
> that often starts at an offset into the buffer (see the comment above d_path()).
> Therefore we end up with a buffer that's not equal to application_id which we
> want to free later. The other way (other than having a void **data parameter)
> would be to allocate a new buffer, copy the resulting path there, and return
> the new buffer instead of the one used by file_path().
> Let me know which solution is preferred.
Good point. Please use the pattern you're already using. I'd prefer a slightly
shorter name though. app_id_data perhaps?
Thanks,
Jens
>
> > > + const char *application_id = NULL;
> > char *app_id = NULL;
> >
> > > int name_len;
> > > int rc;
> > >
> > > @@ -217,6 +286,14 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method,
> > > * For TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP:
> > > * gid=<gid>
> > > *
> > > + * For TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION:
> > > + * app=<application id>
> > > + *
> > > + * For TEEC_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION:
> > > + * uid=<uid>:app=<application id>
> > > + *
> > > + * For TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION:
> > > + * gid=<gid>:app=<application id>
> > > */
> > >
> > > name = kzalloc(TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > @@ -249,6 +326,63 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method,
> > > }
> > > break;
> > >
> > > + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION:
> > > + application_id = tee_session_get_application_id(&application_id_data);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(application_id)) {
> > > + rc = PTR_ERR(application_id);
> > > + goto out_free_name;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "app=%s",
> > > + application_id);
> > > + tee_session_free_application_id(application_id_data);
> > > +
> > > + if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) {
> > > + rc = -E2BIG;
> > > + goto out_free_name;
> > > + }
> > It looks like we remove these tests and replace them with
> > if (name_len < TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE)
> > rc = uuid_v5(uuid, &tee_client_uuid_ns, name, name_len);
> > else
> > rc = -E2BIG
> >
> > below, just above the "out_free_name:" label.
> >
> > This function is small and simple enough that it should be easy to see
> > what's going on any way.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Jens
> >
> > > + break;
> > > +
> > > + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION:
> > > + application_id = tee_session_get_application_id(&application_id_data);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(application_id)) {
> > > + rc = PTR_ERR(application_id);
> > > + goto out_free_name;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "uid=%x:app=%s",
> > > + current_euid().val, application_id);
> > > + tee_session_free_application_id(application_id_data);
> > > +
> > > + if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) {
> > > + rc = -E2BIG;
> > > + goto out_free_name;
> > > + }
> > > + break;
> > > +
> > > + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION:
> > > + memcpy(&ns_grp, connection_data, sizeof(gid_t));
> > > + grp = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), ns_grp);
> > > + if (!gid_valid(grp) || !in_egroup_p(grp)) {
> > > + rc = -EPERM;
> > > + goto out_free_name;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + application_id = tee_session_get_application_id(&application_id_data);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(application_id)) {
> > > + rc = PTR_ERR(application_id);
> > > + goto out_free_name;
> > > + }
> > > + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "gid=%x:app=%s",
> > > + grp.val, application_id);
> > > + tee_session_free_application_id(application_id_data);
> > > +
> > > + if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) {
> > > + rc = -E2BIG;
> > > + goto out_free_name;
> > > + }
> > > + break;
> > > +
> > > default:
> > > rc = -EINVAL;
> > > goto out_free_name;
> > > --
> > > 2.28.0
> > >
>
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