linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 05/18] dmaengine: idxd: add IMS support in base driver

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Date:   Thu, 01 Oct 2020 10:44:58 +0200
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:     "Raj\, Ashok" <ashok.raj@...el.com>
Cc:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>,
        Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@...el.com>, vkoul@...nel.org,
        megha.dey@...el.com, maz@...nel.org, bhelgaas@...gle.com,
        alex.williamson@...hat.com, jacob.jun.pan@...el.com,
        yi.l.liu@...el.com, baolu.lu@...el.com, kevin.tian@...el.com,
        sanjay.k.kumar@...el.com, tony.luck@...el.com, jing.lin@...el.com,
        dan.j.williams@...el.com, kwankhede@...dia.com,
        eric.auger@...hat.com, parav@...lanox.com, rafael@...nel.org,
        netanelg@...lanox.com, shahafs@...lanox.com,
        yan.y.zhao@...ux.intel.com, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        samuel.ortiz@...el.com, mona.hossain@...el.com,
        dmaengine@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-pci@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/18] dmaengine: idxd: add IMS support in base driver

On Wed, Sep 30 2020 at 18:07, Ashok Raj wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 11:57:22PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>
> Devices exposed to guest need host OS support for programming interrupt
> entries in the IOMMU interrupt remapping table. VFIO provides those 
> services for standard interrupt schemes like MSI/MSIx for instance. 
> Since IMS is device specific VFIO can't provide an intercept when 
> IMS entries are programmed by the guest OS.

Why is IMS exposed to the guest in the first place? You expose a
subdevice to a guest, right? And that subdevice should not even know
that IMS exists simply because IMS is strictly host specific.

The obvious emulation here is to make the subdevice look like a PCI
device and expose emulated MSIX (not MSI) which is intercepted when
accessing the MSIX table and then redirected to the proper place along
with IRTE and PASID and whatever.

>> Also this stuff is host side and not guest side. I seriously doubt that
>> you want to hand in the whole PCI device which contains the IMS
>
> You are right, but nothing prevents a user from simply taking a full PCI
> device and assign to guest. 

You surely can and should prevent that because it makes no sense and
cannot work.

That's why you want a generic check for 'this device is magic SIOV or
whatever' and not something burried deep into a driver..

Thanks,

        tglx