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Message-Id: <20201003045059.665934-20-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 07:50:54 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com,
asapek@...gle.com, bp@...en8.de, cedric.xing@...el.com,
chenalexchen@...gle.com, conradparker@...gle.com,
cyhanish@...gle.com, dave.hansen@...el.com, haitao.huang@...el.com,
kai.huang@...el.com, kai.svahn@...el.com, kmoy@...gle.com,
ludloff@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org, nhorman@...hat.com,
npmccallum@...hat.com, puiterwijk@...hat.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, yaozhangx@...gle.com, mikko.ylinen@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH v39 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Add helper function to sanitize error code to prepare for vDSO exception
fixup, which will expose the error code to userspace and runs before
set_signal_archinfo(), i.e. suppresses the signal when fixup is successful.
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 90ee91c244c6..24ab833ede41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -602,6 +602,18 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
oops_end(flags, regs, sig);
}
+static void sanitize_error_code(unsigned long address,
+ unsigned long *error_code)
+{
+ /*
+ * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page
+ * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to
+ * kernel addresses are always protection faults.
+ */
+ if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+ *error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
+}
+
static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address,
unsigned long error_code)
{
@@ -658,6 +670,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
* faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic.
*/
if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
+ sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+
set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
@@ -806,13 +820,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
if (is_errata100(regs, address))
return;
- /*
- * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table
- * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses
- * are always protection faults.
- */
- if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
- error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
+ sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -931,6 +939,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address))
return;
+ sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+
set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
--
2.25.1
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