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Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 16:18:08 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@...il.com>
Cc: containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@...inois.edu>, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@...cmu.edu>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@...hat.com>,
Hubertus Franke <frankeh@...ibm.com>,
Jack Chen <jianyan2@...inois.edu>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Josep Torrellas <torrella@...inois.edu>,
Tianyin Xu <tyxu@...inois.edu>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.pizza>,
Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@...hat.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 seccomp 1/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist
bitmap for fast path
On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 12:14:29PM -0500, YiFei Zhu wrote:
> From: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@...inois.edu>
>
> The overhead of running Seccomp filters has been part of some past
> discussions [1][2][3]. Oftentimes, the filters have a large number
> of instructions that check syscall numbers one by one and jump based
> on that. Some users chain BPF filters which further enlarge the
> overhead. A recent work [6] comprehensively measures the Seccomp
> overhead and shows that the overhead is non-negligible and has a
> non-trivial impact on application performance.
>
> We observed some common filters, such as docker's [4] or
> systemd's [5], will make most decisions based only on the syscall
> numbers, and as past discussions considered, a bitmap where each bit
> represents a syscall makes most sense for these filters.
>
> The fast (common) path for seccomp should be that the filter permits
> the syscall to pass through, and failing seccomp is expected to be
> an exceptional case; it is not expected for userspace to call a
> denylisted syscall over and over.
>
> When it can be concluded that an allow must occur for the given
> architecture and syscall pair (this determination is introduced in
> the next commit), seccomp will immediately allow the syscall,
> bypassing further BPF execution.
>
> Each architecture number has its own bitmap. The architecture
> number in seccomp_data is checked against the defined architecture
> number constant before proceeding to test the bit against the
> bitmap with the syscall number as the index of the bit in the
> bitmap, and if the bit is set, seccomp returns allow. The bitmaps
> are all clear in this patch and will be initialized in the next
> commit.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/c22a6c3cefc2412cad00ae14c1371711@huawei.com/T/
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202005181120.971232B7B@keescook/T/
> [3] https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/116
> [4] https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/ae0ef82b90356ac613f329a8ef5ee42ca923417d/profiles/seccomp/default.json
> [5] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/6743a1caf4037f03dc51a1277855018e4ab61957/src/shared/seccomp-util.c#L270
> [6] Draco: Architectural and Operating System Support for System Call Security
> https://tianyin.github.io/pub/draco.pdf, MICRO-53, Oct. 2020
>
> Co-developed-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@...cmu.edu>
> Signed-off-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@...cmu.edu>
> Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@...inois.edu>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index ae6b40cc39f4..73f6b6e9a3b0 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -143,6 +143,34 @@ struct notification {
> struct list_head notifications;
> };
>
> +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
> +/**
> + * struct action_cache - per-filter cache of seccomp actions per
> + * arch/syscall pair
> + *
> + * @allow_native: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the
> + * filter will always allow the syscall, for the
> + * native architecture.
> + * @allow_compat: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the
> + * filter will always allow the syscall, for the
> + * compat architecture.
> + */
> +struct action_cache {
> + DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_native, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR);
> +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
> + DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_compat, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR);
> +#endif
> +};
> +#else
> +struct action_cache { };
> +
> +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
> + const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
> +
> /**
> * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
> *
> @@ -298,6 +326,47 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
> +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(const void *bitmap,
> + size_t bitmap_size,
> + int syscall_nr)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= bitmap_size))
> + return false;
> + syscall_nr = array_index_nospec(syscall_nr, bitmap_size);
> +
> + return test_bit(syscall_nr, bitmap);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * seccomp_cache_check_allow - lookup seccomp cache
> + * @sfilter: The seccomp filter
> + * @sd: The seccomp data to lookup the cache with
> + *
> + * Returns true if the seccomp_data is cached and allowed.
> + */
> +static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
> + const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +{
> + int syscall_nr = sd->nr;
> + const struct action_cache *cache = &sfilter->cache;
> +
> + if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE))
> + return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_native,
> + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR,
> + syscall_nr);
> +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
> + if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT))
> + return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_compat,
> + SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR,
> + syscall_nr);
> +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
An small optimization for the non-compat case might be to do this to
avoid the sd->arch test (which should have no way to ever change in such
builds):
static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
const struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
const struct action_cache *cache = &sfilter->cache;
#ifndef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
/* A native-only architecture doesn't need to check sd->arch. */
return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_native,
SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR,
sd->nr);
#else /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE))
return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_native,
SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR,
sd->nr);
if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT))
return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_compat,
SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR,
sd->nr);
#endif
WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
return false;
}
> +
> /**
> * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
> * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
> @@ -320,6 +389,9 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
> return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS;
>
> + if (seccomp_cache_check_allow(f, sd))
> + return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> +
> /*
> * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
> * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
> --
> 2.28.0
>
This is all looking good; thank you! I'm doing some test builds/runs
now. :)
--
Kees Cook
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