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Message-ID: <5bf99bdf-b16f-8caf-ba61-860457606b8e@yandex.ru>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 18:48:21 +0300
From: stsp <stsp2@...dex.ru>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] KVM: x86: KVM_SET_SREGS.CR4 bug fixes and cleanup
09.10.2020 18:30, Sean Christopherson пишет:
> On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 05:11:51PM +0300, stsp wrote:
>> 09.10.2020 07:04, Sean Christopherson пишет:
>>>> Hmm. But at least it was lying
>>>> similarly on AMD and Intel CPUs. :)
>>>> So I was able to reproduce the problems
>>>> myself.
>>>> Do you mean, any AMD tests are now useless, and we need to proceed with Intel
>>>> tests only?
>>> For anything VMXE related, yes.
>> What would be the expected behaviour on Intel, if it is set? Any difference
>> with AMD?
> On Intel, userspace should be able to stuff CR4.VMXE=1 via KVM_SET_SREGS if
> the 'nested' module param is 1, e.g. if 'modprobe kvm_intel nested=1'. Note,
> 'nested' is enabled by default on kernel 5.0 and later.
So if I understand you correctly, we
need to test that:
- with nested=0 VMXE gives EINVAL
- with nested=1 VMXE changes nothing
visible, except probably to allow guest
to read that value (we won't test guest
reading though).
Is this correct?
> With AMD, setting CR4.VMXE=1 is never allowed as AMD doesn't support VMX,
OK, for that I can give you a
Tested-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@...rs.sourceforge.net>
because I confirm that on AMD it now
consistently returns EINVAL, whereas
without your patches it did random crap,
depending on whether it is a first call to
KVM_SET_SREGS, or not first.
>> But we do not use unrestricted guest.
>> We use v86 under KVM.
> Unrestricted guest can kick in even if CR0.PG=1 && CR0.PE=1, e.g. there are
> segmentation checks that apply if and only if unrestricted_guest=0. Long story
> short, without a deep audit, it's basically impossible to rule out a dependency
> on unrestricted guest since you're playing around with v86.
You mean "unrestricted_guest" as a module
parameter, rather than the similar named CPU
feature, right? So we may depend on
unrestricted_guest parameter, but not on a
hardware feature, correct?
>> The only other effect of setting VMXE was clearing VME. Which shouldn't
>> affect anything either, right?
> Hmm, clearing VME would mean that exceptions/interrupts within the guest would
> trigger a switch out of v86 and into vanilla protected mode. v86 and PM have
> different consistency checks, particularly for segmentation, so it's plausible
> that clearing CR4.VME inadvertantly worked around the bug by avoiding invalid
> guest state for v86.
Lets assume that was the case.
With those github guys its not possible
to do any consistent checks. :(
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