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Message-Id: <20201012153850.26996-6-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 08:38:29 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v14 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER, and the application is built for the feature.
This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy
non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7101ac64bb20..415fcc869afc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1927,6 +1927,39 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
endchoice
+config AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ def_bool $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh $(CC))
+ help
+ Test the assembler for shadow stack instructions.
+
+config X86_CET
+ def_bool n
+
+config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ def_bool n
+
+config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+ prompt "Intel Shadow Stacks for user-mode"
+ def_bool n
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+ depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select X86_CET
+ select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ help
+ Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack
+ corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters
+ if you have the right hardware. It's a security hardening
+ feature and apps must be enabled to use it. You get no
+ protection "for free" on old userspace. The hardware can
+ support user and kernel, but this option is for user space
+ only.
+ Support for this feature is only known to be present on
+ processors released in 2020 or later. CET features are also
+ known to increase kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh b/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..fac1d363a1b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+echo "wrussq %rax, (%rbx)" | $* -x assembler -c -
--
2.21.0
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